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ABSTRACT 
Three approaches to drought management are developed as 
generalized mathematical models. Each model is then applied 
to particular locations in Utah using the hydrologic/economic 
data from the 1976-77 drought. The modeling approaches include: 
0) A multiple regression approach is used to quantify 
the changes in water use achieved by three common 
municipal sector rationing policies: 
(a) restrictions on time of outdoor use, 
(b) price increases, and 
(c) mandatory quantity restrictions. 
(2) A model was presented for determining the optimal 
long term price schedule for rationing a stochastical-
ly variable water supply during summer peak demand 
season among groups of municipal water users which have 
different demands. 
(3) The third model analyzed various management policies 
in terms of their impact on net benefits to the agri-
cultural and municipal sectors. The model is capable 
of modifying policies monthly, based upon the chang-
ing hydrologic situation. It can vary constraints 
in a manner that simulates an institutional environ-
ment ranging from total freedom of price changes and 
water exchanges between sectors to those constraints 
existing during the 76-77 drought. 
Conclusions include: l) Mandatory water use regulations 
are much more effect ive than price increases in reducing water 
use (at least in a short term drought). 2) A theoretical 
analysis of demand and supply functions showed that Salt Lake 
City's pricing policy (about $0.25/1000 gallons) is very close 
to optimal. 3) The third model showed that very substantial 
losses in consumer surplus in Salt Lake County during the 
drought were caused by various institutional restrictions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF REPORT 
Nature of Drought Planning 
It is not possible to plan for 
drought in isolation from general water 
resources planning. The object ive of a 
rat ional manager of a water supply 
system should be to develop facilities 
which can be operated to maximize 
net benefits from a long term perspec-
tive--considering the relative probabil-
ilities of wet, average, and drought 
years. An optimal plan may, for ex-
ample, anticipate a drastic reduction in 
production (perhaps to zero) if the cost 
of water exceeds its value during an 
infrequent drought period. In fact, the 
economic justification for new facili-
ties is largely based on reducing the 
frequency and severity of these reduc-
tions. 
Once a drought period has begun 
(and more importantly has been recog-
nized as having begun--which is not a 
trivial task), water management takes on 
a short run operating perspective. One 
problem is that of guessing how short 
the perspective should be. A reservoir 
operator, for example, must decide 
whether to release all needed storage 
during the current high demand summer 
season (thereby assuming the drought 
will terminate after one season) or to 
carry some over for use during an 
extended drought. This decision must be 
made in an environment of great un-
certainty (no one can predict multi-year 
weather patterns) and great pressure 
from water users who may already be 
s u f fer i ng los s e s . De a Ii ng wit h t his 
uncertainty is the essence of the 
drought water management problem. 
During the winter of 1976-77, many 
western areas experienced the lowest 
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precipitation totals on record. The 
most serious previous drought in most of 
these areas began in 1931 and lasted 
until 1934. The 1976-77 drought lasted 
only one year, but an enormous drought 
relief effort, for example an $844 
million "drought package" on the federal 
level, resulted. 
Droughts produce the best possible 
political environment in which to 
finance water development projects. 
Often, low interest loans and even 
grants become available from federal and 
'state sources and convert marginal 
projects into profitable projects from 
the perspective of the subsidized 
users. Opportunistically, water devel-
opment interests may best plan for 
drought by stock-piling project designs 
for financing during the next drought. 
Drought is difficult to quantify. 
One difficulty in determining drought 
severity is that it cannot be general-
ized. Even in a region where climatic 
drought conditions are uniformly seri-
ous, the impact upon water users is 
highly site specific (Bowles et al. 
1980). Drought severity and vulner-
ability are functions of many factors 
besides the reduction in supply. Some 
users acquire water rights which signif-
icantly exceed their average-year 
requirement ~n order to insure the 
desired supply during a dry year. 
Others experience serious shortages. 
The type of water source is very impor-
tant in terms of vulnerability to 
drought. Run-of-river users are im-
pacted first, users with reservoirs may 
not be severely impacted unless a 
drought becomes lengthy, and groundwater 
users are best insulated. 
Scope of Report 
A rather extensive literature came 
out of the 1976-77 drought, most of 
which is historical in nature--how 
serious was the drought and how did 
water users and various levels of 
government respond. This report 
attempts to use such information by 
analyzing it on two different levels: 
1. The historic data will be used 
to develop a regression model quanti-
fying the effect iveness of various 
drought management actions taken. 
2. Two optimization models will 
also be developed for analyzing various 
drought management concepts (which may 
or may not have been used during 1976-
77) . 
All three models will be applied hypo-
thetically to the 1976-77 situation in 
order to provide quantitative guidelines 
for future drought management. The 
three models are presented in the next 
three chapters. 
Chapter II begins with a summary of 
actual 1976-77 drought response mecha-
nisms and their use at various levels in 
each of several water using sectors in 
several states. A regression analysis 
of the effect iveness of such policies 
for the municipal sector is presented. 
The regression model appears to have a 
rational theoretical basis and) there-
fore, should be useful for future 
drought management planning applica-
tions. 
Chapter III presents a model for 
rat ioning of water during drought. 
A basic assumption here is that simply 
varying the price of water to match 
supply and demand is not a viable policy 
due to various political/social con-
siderations. Instead, a relatively long 
term pricing policy combined with short 
term quantity rationing rules is sug-
gested for maximizing social welfare 
given the stochastic nature of water 
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supply. This model is applied to the 
Salt Lake City municipal system. 
Ch apt e r I V pre sen t sam u 1 tip 1 e 
sector (municipal/industrial and agri-
cultural) model for drought management. 
The objective of this chapter is to 
compare the economic consequences of the 
water management policies followed in 
Salt Lake County during the 1976-77 
drought to those which are identified by 
the model as being socially optimal. 
This model has the capability of pre-
dicting optimal operating policies 
(updated monthly) given historic hydro-
logic data. 
Organization of Literature Review 
The literature on drought related 
research and management of the 1976-77 
drought will in general be cited and 
discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV as 
specific topics are covered. However, 
some of the literature which is not 
discussed in subsequent chapters will be 
described briefly here: 
1. Weather modification: A 
significant on-going research effort 
is being sponsored by the U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation and by NOAA. This 
Southwest Drought Research Program has 
produced several reports related to the 
technical and economic potential for 
reducing drought severity by weather 
modification. These include: 
Bowles et al., 1981: Development 
of Contingency Plans and Scientific 
Background Studies for Applying Weather 
Modification during Drought Periods in 
Utah. 
Buller et al., 1981: Effect of 
Weather Modification on Supply of Total 
Revenue of a Region. 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1981: 
Southwest Drought Research Program. 
2. James, D. J. and Wade H. 
Andrews, 1978: Water Conservation 
Information Dissemination During the 
1977 Drought Emergency. 
This study was organized during 
1977 to provide, for the exchange of 
drought information among the respective 
states, a forum that could reduce dupli-
cation among independent efforts. The 
project collected information on: a) 
water-use conservation practices; b) 
water-supplies; c) dealing with special 
drought problems. Types of information 
included: 1) research results con-
tributing to dealing more effectively 
with emergency drought situations; 2) 
research currently underway; 3) bro-
chures or other material prepared for 
public distribution; 4) reports of 
extension agents or other technical 
personnel working with the public to 
solve drought problems; and 5) user or 
expert statements recommending supple-
menting or revising any of the above. 
This report contains 667 abstracts and a 
synthesis of the information obtained on 
each topic. 
3. Institute for Policy Research, 
1977: Directory of Federal Drought 
Assistance. 
This report, for the Western Region 
Drought Action Task Force, describes 
more than 40 loan and/or grant type 
drought programs which are administered 
by 15 agencies. The report also cross-
3 
indexes drought problems with appro-
priate programs. 
4. 
1978 : 
Rosenberg, Norman J. (editod, 
North American Droughts. 
This collection of seven papers 
covers a broad range of drought-related 
topics including: a history of American 
drought; concepts for measuring severity 
and economic, political and social 
impacts; and management strategies. 
5. Dyke, Paul T., 1977: Yield 
Response Handbook. 
This handbook describes use of 
the "National Crop Yield Simulator" 
which has been developed by the Economic 
Research Service. The simulator pro-
vides a methodology for calculating crop 
yield changes as a function of drought 
severity in any area of the U.S. 
6. Federal Power Commission-
Federal Energy Administration, 1977: 
Impacts of the Western Drought on 
the Regional Electricity Situation. 
This report analyzes the sensi-
tivity of western energy costs to 
drought conditions. The critical 
proximity of demand to supply capability 
during both winter and summer peaks is 
described. Both short- and long-term 
recommendations for relieving the 
problem during future droughts are 
given. 

CHAPTER II 
SUMMARY OF 1976-77 DROUGHT MANAGEMENT 
RESPONSES AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 
Drought Impact Response 
in 1976-77 
A fairly large literature on the 
1976-77 drought provides substantial 
information on the techniques used to 
mitigate drought impacts. The present 
need is to integrate the descriptive 
information on programs and effects in a 
variety of communities with a model that 
contributes to an overall understanding 
that can contribute to more effective 
program design for future droughts. The 
report attempts to do so by beginning 
with the conceptual model of Figure 1. 
The five traditional water use 
sectors shown in the upper left corner 
of Figure 1 are natural choices for 
grouping drought program impacts. They 
tend to be institutionally distinct 
and coherent interest groups capable of 
mobilizing political support for pro-
grams they favo~ at national, state, and 
local levels. Consequently, they are 
typically identified as the target 
group of public policy. In the present 
discussion, emphasis is placed on the 
municipal, domestic, and agricultural 
sectors because the drought experiences 
of the other three are difficult to 
generalize or were not the object of 
extensive mitigation efforts. 
Drought mit igation initiatives can 
be taken at the federal, state, or local 
level of government or by individual 
water users for their own purposes. The 
programs are characterized by a fairly 
limited set of alternatives, based on 
the program purposes and the mechanisms 
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used to alleviate drought impacts. 
Program purposes fall into some combina-
tion of efforts to reduce the quantities 
of water used, develop new sources of 
supply, recycle water for reuse, or 
provide financial support to enterprises 
suffering drought damage and thereby 
assist in their recovery. For the most 
part, mitigation programs are government 
efforts to influence water users, 
although local governments in particular 
may construct facilities on their own 
initiative. The princ ipal mechanisms 
used to lessen drought impacts are 1) 
information programs to increase aware-
ness of the drought, encourage conserva-
tion, and describe ways of saving 
water; 2) price changes to make high 
volume uses less economical; 3) taxes, 
grants, and loans to encourage specific 
activities (water system leakage repair, 
well-drilling), discourage "wasteful" 
activities, or assist in recovering from 
drought damage; 4) administrative 
allocations such as rationing programs 
and exchange arrangements; and 5) other 
regulations (new hook-up restrictions, 
plumbing code changes). 
There is a tendency to evaluate 
program effectiveness in terms of the 
achievement of program goals. Ideally, 
evaluation should balance program 
accomplishments against the costs of 
achieving them, since achieving program 
goals may cost more than is warranted by 
the results. Practically, however, it 
is di fficul t to compare money spent 
on drought relief with the benefits 
achieved. The benefit s are widely dis-
persed and often d i fficul t to measure. 
Estimation is further complicated from a 
national economic efficiency perspective 
because of distortions produced by 
taxing people with sufficient water to 
subsidize drought victims. From a local 
perspective, most drought program money 
is often capital used to increase water 
supplies during future shortages whose 
magnitudes and timing are difficult to 
predict in even a probabilist ic sense. 
Undoubtedly, the difficulty of measuring 
the net benefits from drought relief 
WATER USE SECTOR I MITIGATION LEVEL 
Municipal/domestic IFederal 
Industrial ~1--------------~l~State 
Agriculture I Local 
Wastewater Other 
Recreation/Environment I 1------------~I-----------4 
J 
I 
., 
MITIGATION EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM DESIGN 
Direct: 
Reduction in use 
New supplies 
Amount recycled 
Compensated damages 
Ul t ima te: 
Damage prevented 
Unit cost of new supply/ 
reduction in use 
Long term vs short term 
PURPOSES 
Reduce use 
Augment supply 
~.- Recycle 
Damage recovery 
MECHANISMS 
Facilities construction 
Information/persuasion 
Price 
Tax, Grants, Loans 
Administrative allocation 
Regulation 
CONSTRAINTS AND SIDE EFFECTS 
User discretion and incentives 
Revenue impacts 
Distributive impacts 
Timing 
Administrative capacity 
Etc. 
Figure 1. Drought impact mitigation program cycle. 
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programs is a strong reason for so few 
evaluations. 
One format for organizing drought 
experiences is through a tabular display 
structured according to the schematic of 
Figure 1. Water use sectors provide the 
primary divisions and can be subdivided 
by the government level initiating the 
program. Entries are made by purpose 
and mechanism, constraints and side 
effects, and effectiveness, and then 
cited by a source citation. Such a 
tabular display of information on the 
1976-77 drought is given in the Appen-
dix. 
An Analysis of Drought Policy 
Effectiveness in the 
Municipal Sector 
Introduction 
Many municipal water supply systems 
in Utah (particularly the larger urban 
systems) depend largely upon surface 
water sources. In 1976-77, the below-
normal precipitation during the winter 
and the resulting low spring run-
off adversely affected surface water 
availability. Because of time and 
financial constraints, the options for 
augmenting supplies by developing 
groundwater or constructing facilities 
for importing water from other areas. 
we r e not f e as i b 1 e . Lac k 0 f 1 a r g e 
storage facilities and the concern 
that the drought might continue into the 
next year prompted municipalities to 
ration available supplies. 
Decisions as to whether to impose 
rationing mechanisms and the form 
and the extent to which to impose them 
depended largely on the municipality's 
perception of the drought severity as 
well as its perception of the suitabil-
ity and effectiveness of the various 
rationing devices for the speci fic 
system. Three major categories of 
policies for restricting water use, with 
several variants of each category, were 
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implemented in different parts of the 
state (Hughes et al. 1978). These were 
higher prices, mandatory maximum use 
restr tions, and restrictions on times 
of outdoor watering. The purpose of 
this chapter is to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of these various policies in 
reducing water use in the short run. 
Policies 
Among the three major rationing 
policies implemented during the drought 
period in Utah, the most common was the 
restriction of watering time for outdoor 
use. Of the 33 systems for which 
information was available, 24 imposed 
time restrictions. Total hours allowed 
for outdoor watering in a week ranged 
between 0 and 105 hours. Nine systems 
implemented price changes, and five 
systems imposed mandatory quantity 
restrictions. There were three systems 
that had price changes as we 11 as time 
restrictions. Four systems had both 
time restrictions and mandatory quantity 
restrictions. Price increases ranged 
from $0.03 to $1.25 per 1000 gallons (10 
percent to 500 percent). The quantity 
restrict ions ranged from 36,000 gallons 
per connection to 6000 gallons per 
connection per month. The distributions 
of normal (average for years 1973-75) 
water use per capita and per connection 
for the 33 communities are shown in 
Figures 2 and 3. The water use reduc-
tions achieved during the drought are 
shown in Figure 4. The mean reduction 
was 156 gallons per connection. The 
standard deviation was 214. Although 27 
systems reported a reduction in water 
use, six systems had an increase. This 
study attempts to quantify the water use 
reductions associated with different 
policies and thereby establish the 
relative effectiveness of each of the 
rationing devices through a cross-
sectional analysis using a multiple 
regression model. To formulate an 
appropriate model, it ~s important to 
understand the mechanisms whereby the 
different policies affected water 
use. 
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Figure 4. Water use reductions. 
Changes in Prices 
The price structure for most of the 
municipalities included a fixed monthly 
charge for a connection. This monthly 
charge allowed the users to consume up 
to a specified number of gallons with no 
additional charge. The minimum monthly 
charge varied from $2 to $11, and the 
quantity allowance varied from 3,000 to 
12,000 gallons. In addition, there was 
a price for water consumption in excess 
of the allowance. Generally, the 
additional price ranged from $0.10 to 
$0.30 per thousand gallons. Some of the 
systems reported increasing multiple 
block rate structures and a couple of 
systems had declining multiple block 
rate structures. Two systems had a flat 
rate per connection with no variable 
charges based on the quantity of water 
consumed. 
Price changes during drought 
inc luded a) an increase in the minimum 
charge (either directly or by decreasing 
the quantity that could be used without 
increasing the charge), b) an increase 
in the price associated with additional 
9 
water consumption, and c) an increase in 
the progressivity of the multiple block 
rates. 
The three cases are illustrated 
in Figure 5. In Figure Sa, D repre-
sents the demand for water. When the 
minimum charge is raised or the quantity 
entitlement corresponding to this 
minimum charge is reduced (from Q* to 
Q*'), the demand D will shift to D' 
due to an income effe~t (normally small) 
causing a change in quantity consumed 
from Q to Q I • In Figure 5b, the price 
is changed from P to p'. In Figure 5c, 
the demand curves for two users, Dl and 
D2, are shown each facing a different 
price PI and P2 respectively. When 
their prices are increased to PI' and 
P2', their quantity demanded falls 
from Ql and Q2 to Ql' and Q2' respec-
tively. 
In case (a), the cost of the 
intramarginal units increases with no 
change in the price of the marginal 
units. If the income effects are small, 
such changes will have negligible effect 
on water consumption. In case (b), the 
w 
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Figure 5. Effect of pr1ce changes on water use. 
quantity consumed will change by an 
amount determined by the price elastic-
ity of demand for water and the change 
in the price. In case (c), the costs of 
both the intramarginal units as well as 
the marginal units will increase. As 
under the assumption that the income 
elasticity of demand for water is small, 
the effect on marginal units can be 
calculated as for case (b). However, 
there are additional complications in 
measuring price changes in this case due 
to the mUltiple block rates. The price 
changes for each blbck could be differ-
ent. In order to measure the effective 
price change, one must know the demand 
distribution. Since such information 
was not available to this study, the 
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price change corresponding to the 
average consumption block was taken to 
represent the effective price change. 
Time Restrictions 
The most common type of time 
restriction imposed on outdoor water 
use was to allow a household to water 
only on particular days. Usually the 
restrictions specified the hours for 
lawn watering, presumably to maintain 
adequate pressure for fire hydrants. 
The total hours in a week during which 
water use was restricted ranged from 4 
to 83 in the sample. Many systems 
imposed the time restrictions on a 
voluntary basis. Some cities, however, 
passed an ordinance prohibiting water 
use for certain times, thus making the 
restrictions mandatory. Because no 
special enforcement effort was made in 
the mandatory cases, no attempt was made 
to distinguish between the voluntary and 
mandatory restrictions in the analysis. 
The total hours of restrictions were 
computed for each of the systems in the 
sample. 
The effect of time restrictions on 
outdoor use could be analyzed as fol-
lows. A household can be assumed to 
produce "lawn and garden" output by com-
bining water, labor and other purchased 
inputs. The optimal amount of "lawn and 
garden" is determined by the inter-
section of the demand and the supply 
curves. The supply is the marginal 
cost of producing an additional unit 
area of "lawn and garden" where water 
and household labor are inputs. The 
time restrictions influence the oppor-
tunity cost of household labor by 
shifting the individual's time schedule 
for watering. In the absence of mechan-
ical devices for watering (such as 
timers, automatic lawn sprinklers, 
etc.), the changes required 1.n the 
time schedule of the homeowner impose 
additional costs on his time. Under 
"moderate" time restrictions, th·is 
factor (increased opportunity cost of 
his time) may predominate causing the 
derived demand for outdoor water use to 
shift downward. Under more "stringent" 
time restrictions, the amount of water 
deliverable to lawn and garden may be 
severely limited, implying a quantity 
rationing of outdoor water use. 
These concepts are illustrated in 
Figure 6. In Figure 6a, the demand D 
and marginal cost S curves for "lawns 
and gardens" are shown. The normal area 
for lawn and garden Ao is determined by 
the intersection of D and S. The demand 
curve for water Dw for this area is 
shown in Figure 6b as derived from given 
prices for all ·inputs such as house-
holds, time cost, fertilizer, etc. At 
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the initial price Pw' an amount Qo is 
used outdoors. When a time restriction 
1.S imposed, the opportunity cost of 
labor increases causing the demand for 
water Dw to shift to Dw' assuming 
water and labor inputs are comple-
mentary. This will cause the supply of 
lawn and garden to shi ft from S to S'. 
The new quantity Ao' of lawn and garden 
is irrigated with qo'. A reduction of 
qo to ,qo' is achieved through this 
policy. However, with "stringent" time 
reductions, the individual may not be 
able to use the amount of water he 
desires. This situation is also shown 
in Figure 6b where the demand shifts to 
Dw". The desired quantity at price 
Pw is qo". However, the amount of 
water that the user is able to withdraw 
from the system is qo* (within the 
given time). The shadow price of water 
is Pw* under this scheme for rationing 
outdoor water use. 
While restrictions limiting the 
times of watering may not affect all 
the households served from a given 
system, the number of connections 
affected will increase with the hours of 
restriction. Reasons for differential 
effects among households include differ-
ent lot sizes, the shadow prices of 
labor. for gardening, and the number of 
people in the household. The effect on 
aggregate demand can be illustrated 
with the aid of Figure 7. Let D1 and 
D2 represent two household demands, and 
let D be the aggregate demand curve. A 
time restriction will shift D1 and 
D2 downward and hence the aggregate 
demand D downward to D'. A "severe" 
time restriction might impose quantity 
rationing on individual 2 but not 
individual 1. In this case individual 2 
can consume only up to q2* while con-
sumption by individual 1 is determined 
by his demand curve. The aggregate 
demand D is further reduced to D". 
As the time restriction becomes more 
severe, a greater shift in the aggregate 
demand can be expected as more house-
holds become affected. 
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Mandatory Maximum Use Restrictions 
According to this policy for 
restricting water use, the maximum 
amount of water that can be consumed per 
month per connection is limited to a 
specified quantity. The restrictions 
per connection ranged from 6,000 gallons 
to 36,000 gallons per month. Unlike 
time restrictions where only the outdoor 
wa ter use is affected, the quant ity 
restriction affects both indoor and 
outdoor uses. However, the restriction 
allows the household to allocate water 
between indoor and outdoor use in any 
manner it chooses, while the time 
restriction distorts this allocation by 
restricting only the outdoor use. 
Quantity rationing does not affect 
households that would use less than the 
rationed amount anyway. As the ration 
is reduced, more households are con-
strained. The economic relationships 
through which this scheme affects 
aggregate demand are similar to those 
for "stringent" time restrictions In 
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that aggregate demand shifts to the left 
as in Figure 7. However, this shift has 
to be distinguished from time restric-
tions in that it reduces both indoor and 
outdoor uses whereas for time restric-
tions, although the total water use 
might decrease, the indoor use actually 
might increase. 
An index was constructed to measure 
the quantity restriction. The need for 
an index, instead of using the ration 
quantity directly, arises due to systems 
that did not have quantity rations. 
For these systems, a zero value could 
not be used since it would cause numeric 
di fficul ties. The maximum average 
monthly use per connection was found to 
be approximately 60,000 gallons. This 
figure was used as a restriction for 
systems that did not use any quantity 
rationing. The index Q was defined as 
the ratio of the ration amount to 
60,000. This measure is 1 for systems 
that did not impose rations and between 
o and 1 for those that did. The index 
falls as the ration quantity decreases. 
Other Restrictions 
In addition to the above three 
policies, many of the water supply 
systems implemented other water use 
restrictions. These included prohibi-
tion of water use for washing parking 
lots, driveways, and sidewalks, and 
reductions of water use in city parks. 
Quantitative measures of such restric-
tions were not available, and their 
effects were ignored in the analysis. 
Model Formulation 
An empirical model is needed 
to evaluate how various drought poli-
cies affected water use. The logical 
starting point is to assume a household 
demand function. Several demand studies 
(Howe and Linawe aver 1967, Gardner and 
Schick 1964, Hansen and Narayanan 
1981, Hanke 1970, Young 1973, Hughes 
1980) suggest relevant variables as 
important in the determination of water 
demand. For example, one might use a 
general demand reI ationship 0 f the 
form: 
x = X(P, I, N, L, Rf, T) . (1) 
where X is the consumption of water per 
connection, P is the marginal price, I 
is the household income, N is the number 
of people in the household, L is the lot 
size, Rf is the rainfall and T is the 
temperature during the growing season. 
In this formulation, the water demand is 
determined by household characteristics 
Land N, environmental variables Rf 
and T, and economic variables P and I. 
The drought policy variables then need 
to be introduced. These are the time 
restriction R, the quantity restriction 
Q, and the changed price. Now, the 
demand X can be written as 
X ::: X(P, R, Q, I, N, L, Rf, T). (2) 
Since the purpose of the study is to 
evaluate drought policies and not to 
estimate the demand, one can consider 
the total derivative of the above 
demand, 
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dx ::: ~ dP + ax dR + ~ dQ + "I dI + 
ap aR aQ a 
aN dN + ~~ dL + ~~f dRf + ~~ dT (3) 
In the above expression, it can be 
assumed that no changes in I, N, L, 
and T are caused by drought conditions. 
The changes in the other variables were 
taken as their differences between a 
predrought period defined as the average 
during 1973-1975 and the drought period 
taken as the 1977 calendar year. The 
rainfall was included in the model for 
the 1977 growing season as an explana-
tory variable because the average summer 
rainfall for most sites in Utah in 1977 
was larger than normal (water supply 
primarily comes from winter snow) and 
could have reduc ed water use. The 
change in use per connection is thus 
given by 
+ ax ax ax dx = ap dP aR dR + aQ dQ +aa- dRf f 
(4) 
For small changes, assuming the respec-
tive derivatives to remain constant, a 
linear model with the stochastic speci-
fication can be given by 
where € is assumed to be random"distur-
bance term with zero mean and constant 
variance. Equation 4 can also be 
written ln percentage form as 
dx 
x 
(6) 
Th ff " t ' , , d ' e coe 1Clen s CI, P , Cl,R ,O'.Q an 0'. Rf 
represent elasticities or percentage 
changes in per connection consumption 
per unit percentage ch.ange in the 
explanatory variables P, R, Q, and Rf. 
Equation 6 can also be given a stochas-
tic specification like Equation 5 
a' (1 - Q) + a 
Q 1 R f 
(7) 
where the base values for Rand Q are 
respectively 168 (total hours in a week) 
and 1 (systems with no ration quantity). 
The procedure followed in assessing 
the impacts of the drought measures with 
these equations follows immediately 
below. Numerical result s are given in 
the next section. First Equations 5 and 
6 were estimated using ordinary least 
squares for preliminary evaluation of 
the model. The linear form appeared to 
provide better explanatory power than 
the percentage form. .Therefore, the 
linear form was retained for further 
analysis. 
The assumption that the coeffi-
cients (as) are constant may be somewhat 
restric tive. For the time restriction, 
aR is likely to be related to the 
average normal consumption per connec-
tion Xo and the number of people in a 
household N. With the same N, the 
larger the value of XO, the greater 
will be the effect of time restriction. 
Similarly, given the same XO, for any 
two systems, the system with larger N is 
likely to experience a smaller effect on 
water use than is the system with 
smaller N. Therefore, it is hypothe-
sized that 
N (8) 
Substituting this relationship, Equation 
5 becomes 
(9) 
The regression results showed the 
explanatory power of the equation 
to improve greatly, and the coefficients 
had the expected signs. 
The other coefficients in Equation 
5 were also tested to see if they 
depended on Xo and N. In particular, 
the following relationships were postu-
lated: 
aQ = aQ + aQ Xo + aQ N 0 1 2 
• (10) 
and 
a = ap + ap Xo + ap N p 
0 1 2 
• (11) 
These relationships were substituted in 
Equation 9 one at a time. The criteria 
used to judge the explanatory power of 
the added variables included i2 (the 
value of R2 adjusted for the degrees 
of freedom) and the t values for indi-
vidual coefficients. In both cases, the 
value of R declined from that with 
Equation 9, and the t statistics for the 
three coefficients of Equations 10 and 
11 were not significantly different from 
zero at 10 percent level. In fact, only 
one t value corresponding to the esti-
mate of aPl was greater than 1. The 
F statistic was also lower in both cases 
compared to Equation 9. Based on this 
analysis, it was concluded that aQ and 
ap can be regarded as constants. 
Of the 24 systems which had time 
restrictions, 9 were voluntary. While 
the other 15 systems made little 
enforcement effort, they may have 
achieved better compliance because of an 
expectation of possible penalty costs. 
To examine for significant differences 
between these two groups, a test of the 
hypothesis that the water use reduction 
for the voluntary case is different 
15 
from that for the mandatory case was 
proposed. To do thi s, Equat ion 8 was 
rewritten as 
. (2) 
where D = 1 if voluntary restriction was 
imposed and 0 otherwise. The null 
hypothesis could not be rejected if 
a RD turned out to be significantly 
different from zero. After substituting 
Equation 12 into Equation 9, the follow-
ing equation was reestimated: 
+ E: .(13) 
The aRD estimate proved significant at 
the 5 percent level, and the values of 
R, R2, and t indicated that the coeffi-
cients were significantly different from 
o at the 5 percent level. The numerical 
results of the estimated equations 
(Equations 5. 6, 9, and 13) and their 
implications are discussed below. 
Model Results 
A statewide water use survey was 
made in Utah near the end of 1977 
jointly by the Utah Water Research 
Laboratory and the Utah League of Cities 
and Towns. A section of the survey 
instrument related specifically to the 
drought was inc luded (Hansen et al. 
1978). Data from 33 cities were suffi-
ciently complete to be used in the 
regression model. Table 1 contains 
these data. The models in linear and 
percentage forms corresponding to 
Equations 5 and 6 were estimated by 
ordinary least squares. The estimated 
equation and the associated statistics 
were: 
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Model A: 
(XO-X1) = 281.7 (PI - PO) + 0.598 R 
+ 283.2 (l-Q) - 57.3 (RfO-Rfl) 
. (4) 
t values: (1.790)(1.744)(1.723)(-1.833) 
R2 = 0.47 R = 0.40 F(4,29) = 6.53 
Model B: 
. 05) 
t values: (2.314)(1.510)(3.330)(-0.993) 
R2 = 0.54 R = 0.48 F(4,29) = 8.51 
In Equation 14, all the individual 
coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level, and 
the F ratio indicates that the set of 
coefficients as a whole is significantly 
different for zero at the 5 percent 
level. In Equation 15, the estimated 
coefficient of aRf has a low + value 
an d the est i mat e d co e f f i c i en t 0 faR 
1S significantly different from zero 
at only 10 percent level. 
The results of the two models can 
be compared at the mean values of the 
explanatory variables. By taking the 
reference value of price P = 0.25/1000 
gallons, water use Xo = 1000 gallons per 
connection per day, rainfall Rf = 3.5 
inches, time restriction R = 125 hours 
and the quantity restriction Q = 0.5 
(30,000 gallons per month), the coeffi-
cients of Models A and B are converted 
to examine changes in water use reduc-
tion. 
Table 1. Regression model data. 
ter Use 
System Name County Population Number of Connections Million gallons/year 
1973-75 1977 1973-75 1977 1973-75 1977 
Aurora Sevier 613 785 189 242 33 60 
Fillmore Millard 1,736 2,726 724 913 284 297 
Heber Wasatch 3,535 3,448 1,233 1,230 554 416 
Ivins Washington 203 331 96 157 28 34 
Kearns Salt Lake 13 ,473 15,092 3,849 4,312 1,267 693 
Layton Davis 17 ,708 19,678 4,184 4,412 1,227 1,076 
Lehi Utah 5,688 7,015 1,658 1,852 386 355 
Lindon Utah 2,030 2,514 457 550 153 183 
Manilla Daggett 319 375 184 247 28 48 
Pleasant Grove Utah 6,186 9,077 1,868 2,254 765 1,174 
Provo Utah 59,000 67,744 10,639 11,218 6,331 6,401 
Riverton Salt Lake 4,900 6,192 1,232 1,548 288 244 
Salt Lake Co.WCD Salt Lake 17,920 19,950 5,973 6,650 1,792 1,466 
So. Davis WID Davis 5,171 6,219 1,620 1,762 246 247 
So. Jordan Salt Lake 3,823 5,009 886 1,165 238 214 
So. Salt Lake Salt Lake 8,748 9,197 2,640 2,705 931 1,012 
...... Spanish Fork Utah 8,779 9,309 2,545 2,756 681 899 
-..J 
Springville Utah 9,887 10,816 2,933 3,209 2,237 1,728 
Taylor-Bennion Salt Lake 16,678 25,452 4,768 7,272 1,276 1,267 
Uintah Uinta 521 712 149 203 61 64 
Vernal Uinta 12,563 12,472 3,315 3,043 1,543 1,380 
Washington Terrace Weber 7,909 8,540 1,911 2,005 278 283 
Brigham Ci ty Box Elder 15,367 16,400 3,904 3,964 2,207 1,777 
East Carbon Carbon 2,100 2,200 671 747 273 161 
Hyrum Cache 2,955 3,485 946 1,100 524 499 
Jensen WID Uintah 571 820 143 205 32 37 
Kenilworth Carbon 503 509 108 109 19 9 
Monticello San Juan 1,692 1,900 578 650 195 96 
North Salt Lake Davis 2,781 3,573 624 812 480 685 
Orem Utah 33,801 42,678 7,898 10,042 3,605 3,647 
Payson Utah 6,368 8,200 2,000 2,300 1,028 1,000 
Price Carbon 10,564 11,193 4,056 4,332 989 834 
West Bountiful Davis 1,945 2,500 386 615 89 99 
Table 1 Cont 
Percent 
Change in Price Percent Voluntary Mandatory Quantity Change Change 
Water Use Change Price Time Time Restriction in in 
System Name (gal/day/ ($/1000 Change Restriction Restriction Index Rainfall Rainfall 
conn.) gal) (hr/wk) (hr/wk) (I-g) (inches) 
Aurora -200 0 0 0 133 0 -0.24 -0.085 
Fillmore 184 0 0 0 0 0 0.56 0.166 
Heber 303 0 0 0 147 0 -0.43 -0.112 
Ivins 199 0.25 83 0 0 0 -0.46 -0.239 
Kearns 461 0 0 0 164 0.67 -0.76 -0.210 
Layton 135 0.15 60 0 0 0 0.10 0.024 
Lehi 112 0.10 50 0 0 0 -1.01 -0.334 
Lindon 10 0 96 0 0 0.16 0.049 
Manilla -109 0.05 10 0 0 0 -0.68 -0.178 
Pleasant Grove -303 0 156 0 0 -1.01 -0.334 
Provo 67 0 0 144 0 -1.01 -0.334 
Riverton 209 0 0 164 2.0 -0.76 -0.210 
Salt Lake Co. 217 0 0 164 0.67 -0.76 -0.210 
WCD 
..... So. Davis WID 31 0 0 163 0 0.10 0.024 CIJ 
So. Jordan 233 0 0 164 0.67 -0.76 -0.210 
So. Sa It Lake -58 0 164 0 0 -0.76 -0.210 
Spanish Fork -160 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.049 
Springville 614 0 0 156 0 -1.01 -0.334 
Taylor-Bennion 255 0 0 164 0 -0.76 -0.210 
Uintah 271 0.08 36 0 0 0 -0.74 -0.261 
Vernal 33 0.40 200 160 0 0 -0.74 -0.261 
Washington 12 0 0 158 0 -0.35 -0.081 
Terrace 
Brigham ci ty 320 0.03 16 0 0 0 -4.80 -1.411 
East Carbon 523 0 0 168 0 0.19 0.046 
.Hyrum 276 0 0 84 0 -3.82 -0.972 
Jensen WID 127 0 132 0 0 -0.74 -0.261 
Kenilworth 269 0 0 0 9.0 0.19 0.046 
Monticello 523 1. 25 500 168 0 0 -0.83 -0.149 
North Salt Lake -200 0 84 0 0 0.10 0.024 
Orem 255 0 63 0 0 -1.01 -0.334 
Payson 217 0 84 0 0 0.16 0.049 
Price 140 0 0 144 0 0.19 0.046 
West Bountiful 190 0.27 117 0 164 0 0.10 0.024 
The result s suggest that at these 
reference values, a 1 percent increase 
in price will reduce water use by 0.07 
to 0.09 percent. A 1 percent increase 
in time restriction (I.68 hours per 
week) reduc es wa ter use by 0.064 to 
0.075 percent. A 1 percent increase in 
Q (implying a restriction of an addi-
tional 3,000 gallons/month from the· 
initial 30,000 gallons) will lead to a 
0.014 to 0.054 percent reduction in 
water use. If the rainfall during the 
growing season exceeds the mean value 
by 1 percent, a reduction of 0.1 to 
0.2 percent in water use would take 
place. The corresponding water use 
reductions in gallons per day per 
connection are shown in parentheses in 
Table 2. 
Due to the lower t values in Model 
B for some of the coefficients, Model A 
was used as the basis for further 
analysis. Equation 9 was estimated 
using ordinary least-squares. The 
result was 
Model C 
XO-X1 = 232.5(P1-PO) + 2.57 R - 0.84 NR 
+ 0.00122 XOR + 335.7l(1-Q) 
t values: 1.591 1.754 -2.254 1.899 
2.201 -1.726 
0.59 R = 0.5 F(6,2]) = 6.47 
Except for the price change, all 
the coefficients are significant at 
the 5 percent level. The price change 
coefficient is significant at the 10 
percent level. The F ratio and the R2 
and R values improved significantly. 
The price elasticity decreased at 
the reference values. The mandatory 
quantity restriction and the rainfall 
variable have more pronounced effects on 
water use. The effectiveness of time 
restriction is now a function of Xo 
and N. At a reference value for N = 3.5 
and Xo = 1000, the coefficient of R is 
0.85 as compared to 0.598 for Model A. 
The hypothesis, that the water use 
reductions in the case of voluntary 
time restriction was significantly 
different from that with the mandatory 
restrict ion, was tested based on Equa-
tion 13. The estimated equation and the 
associated statistics are provided 
below: 
Model D 
XO-Xl = 412.1(Pl-PO) + 2.24 R - 1.69 DR 
- 0.707 NR + 0.0015 XOR 
Table 2. Comparison of water use for Models A and B. 
Model A Model B 
Coefficients Reference Values Percent (gal/day) Percent (gal/day) 
CtP' P = 0.25 0.07 (70) 0.088 (88) 
-
CtR' R = 125 0.075 (75) 0.0644 (64.4) 
-
CtQ' Q 0.5 0.014 (14.2) 0.054 (54) 
-
CtR ' Rf = 3.5 -0.200 (200) -0.107 ClO]) f 
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t values: 2.857 1.712 -2.86 -2.1 
2.586 1.945 -1.868 
R2 = 0.69 R = 0.6 F(7,26) = 8.19 
The coefficients are all significant ly 
different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. The F ratio also indicates that 
the set of coefficients is signific~ntly 
different from zero. The value of Rand 
R2 increased from the previous model. 
Based on the t value corresponding to 
DR, the hypothesis could not be re-
jected. The coefficient of DR has 
the expected sign. 
Model D suggests a price elasticity 
of 0.103 at the base values of P = 
$0.25/1000 gallon and Xo = 1000 gallons 
per day. The coefficient of time 
restriction at the reference values 
is given by 1.27 for mandatory restric-
tion and -0.58 for voluntary restric-
tion. This implies that an average hour 
of time restriction per week reduces 
water use by 1.27 gallons per day if 
mandatory and increases water use by 
0.58 gallons per day if voluntary. 
Although voluntary restriction increases 
use at the base values of Xo and N, 
systems with large values of Xo and 
small values of N (large initial use and 
small families) would experience use 
reductions with voluntary restrictions. 
In fact, .only three of the nine systems 
that had voluntary restriction actually 
experienced increased consumption. One 
possible explanation for this effect is 
that voluntary restriction may cause 
the consumer to expect more stringent 
restrictions later in the season and 
respond by overwatering. In any case, 
voluntary restriction does not seem 
to be an effective tool ~n reducing 
water use. 
Conclusions 
A multiple regression model was 
developed to determine the water use 
reduct10ns achieved by three efforts of 
communities to conserve water. These 
efforts were price increases, time 
restrictions on the hours of outdoor 
water use, and volume restrictions on 
maximum monthly water use. According to 
the bes t mode l: 
1. A 1 percent ~ncrease 
leads to one tenth of a percent 
~n the quantity consumed. 
. . 
~n pr~ce 
decrease 
2. The effectiveness of time 
restrictions on outdoor use depends 
upon the "normal" water use level, the 
number of people in the household, and 
whether or not t he res tr ic t ion was 
imposed on a voluntary or mandatory 
basis. An increase in the mandatory 
time restriction of 1 hour per week 
decreases total water use by 1.27 
gallons per day if the average water use 
is 1000 gallons per day for an average 
connection serving 3.5 people. For 
systems wi th higher use leve Is and 
fewer people per connect ion, the water 
use reduction will be greater. For the 
case of voluntary restriction, water use 
sometimes increased, particularly for 
systems with smaller use levels and 
higher number of people per connection. 
3. For every 1000 gallon reduc-
tion in maximum monthly water use, a 
reduction of 4.46 gallons per day in 
use was observed. 
From an economic efficiency point 
of view, mandatory restrictions on the 
times of outdoor watering are a poor 
choice of policy because they affect 
only one type of use. Unless enforce-
ment costs are significantly higher or 
fewer marginal uses occur indoors, 
manda tory quanti t y res t ric t ions are 
better since they allow households 
to allocate water between outdoor and 
indoor uses in any way they choose. 
They do not distort the marginal rate of 
substitution between indoor and outdoor 
water uses. 
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If distributional considerations 
are not important, the third method, 
price change, would be a still better 
alternative since the marginal rate of 
substitution between water and all other 
goods used by households would remain 
equal. However, from the model, it 
appears that the short-run price elas-
ticity is small and it might take a 
large increase in price to accomplish a 
reasonable reduction in use. A 20 
21 
percent reduction in water use would 
require more than doubling the price. 
Voluntary periods for outdoor 
watering was ineffective in reducing 
water use. On the other hand, there was 
little cost; and the program may be a 
reasonable alternative for areas with 
high use levels and few users per 
connection. 

CHAPTER III 
USE OF RATIONING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
WATER SYSTEMS WITH A STOCHASTIC SUPPLY 
Introduction 
Many of the municipal water supply 
systems in the western United States 
depend largely upon surface water 
sources which exhibit substantial 
annual variability. Such communities 
are often reluctant to vary the price of 
water as a means of coping with supply 
variability. This may be due to lags in 
the bureaucratic process required for 
price determination, desire for price 
stability, or concern for equity. 
Perhaps the National Water Commission 
(1973, p. 251) was considering these 
factors When it recommended: 
(Water) Users should ••• be 
reasonably certain as to the 
pricing situation they face. 
This means that •.. overall 
price structure should not be 
changed frequently. The 
uncertainty to be avoided is 
frequent or abrupt c hanges--
more often than every three to 
five years--i n the overall 
price structure. 
However, short-run price rigidity 
leads to shortages whenever the avail-
able water is less than the total 
quantity demanded at current prices. 
The traditional mechanism to deal with 
these shortages is to implement some 
form of rationing. 
If the demand curves for water by 
each individual were known, the ration 
allotments could be set to make the 
marginal values equal to all users at 
the point where the water supply is 
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exhausted. This would result in the 
optimal distribution of the water 
supply but would require complete 
and perfect information on the water 
market. 
Because this is unrealistic, 
economists are more likely to recommend 
taking advantage of the market by 
issuing resalable ration coupons to 
water users (Layard and Walters, pp. 
200-201). The method eliminates the 
welfare losses associated with more 
rigid rationing, but the administrative 
costs of issuing ration coupons and 
implement ing the trans fer of wa ter 
entitlements from one household to 
another may be more costly than the 
welfare gains achieved. 
A more common rat ioning scheme is 
to set different quotas for different 
households based upon their past water 
consumption during normal years. If 
consumers have advance knowl edge that 
this method of rationing will be imple-
mented at times of water shortage, they 
would tend to shi ft their demand func-
tions. That is, they would consume more 
water when it is plentiful, in order to 
avoid being penalized during shortages 
for past low consumption levels. 
From an administrative point of 
view, the least costly method of 
rationing seems to be to set equal 
quotas for all users. In this case, 
there would be no need for information 
on marginal valuations of water to 
different users, and the cost of col-
lecting this information would be 
eliminated. Furthermore, the water 
users could remain anonymous to the 
water supply authorities. However, this 
method of rationing results in unequal 
marginal rates of substitution for water 
among users and between water and other 
goods. 
The most common means of enforcing 
rationing is by imposing penalties on 
violators. This practice was imple-
mented in California during the drought 
of 1976-77. In describing the East Bay 
Municipal Utility District conservation 
program, Harnet (1978) reports: 
To provide incentive for 
customers to reduce consump-
tion .•• excess use charges 
were established for customers 
exceeding their allotment. 
Additional provisions included 
installation of flow restric-
tors in meters of domestic 
customers who persisted in 
using more than their allot-
ments.... possible discon-
tinuance of service in cases 
of c ont inued ext reme abuse 
also was authorized. 
Summary of Drought Experience 
Many western water utilities were 
faced with reduced water supplies 
during the 1976-77 water year. Of the 
154 Utah municipal water systems sur-
veyed, approximately 50 percent re-
stricted water usage (Hughes et al. 
1978). Half of the restrictions were 
mandatory and the other half were 
voluntary. The forms of restrictions 
included limitations of water use by 
both days of the week and hours of the 
day and prohibition of certain outdoor 
water uses. About 36 percent of the 
systems increased water prices. How-
ever, only a third of these systems 
admitted to increasing the price due 
to reduced water supply conditions. 
In California, it was estimated 
that over 150 communities, serving 
about one-third of all Californians, 
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were subjected to some form of mandatory 
curtailment of water use during the 
height of the drought. These mandatory 
curtailments generally took one of 
two forms: 1) a percentage reduction 
from the previous year's use or 2) a 
quota expressed in gallons per day per 
person or per household. Nearly all 
Californians engaged to some degree in 
water conservation programs (Department 
of Water Resources/State of California 
1978). 
The record suggests that, under 
conditions of water shortage, most water 
supply authorities prefer to set an 
equal ration quota for each household. 
However, the ration allotments are often 
set arbitrarily, and the long-run water 
prices are not generally consistent with 
the rationing scheme imposed during 
shortages. 
Previous Research 
A number of researchers have 
examined the effect of stochastic 
supplies on water management. Turnovsky 
(1969) analyzed the effects of stochas-
tic water supply on consumer demand by 
using supply variation as an argument of 
the demand function. For water pricing 
and capacity expansion decisions with 
stochastic water supply conditions, Crew 
and Roberts (1970) used maximization of 
expected we lfare gain as the planning 
criterion. They assume that when there 
is a water shortage, consumers are 
ranked according to their willingness to 
pay, even though they all pay the same 
price. 
There ~s a large body of literature 
on rationing electricity when the peak 
demand exceeds the existing capacity of 
electric utilities. Brown and Johnson 
(1969) assumed that capacity could be 
costlessly allocated among consumers on 
the basis of greatest willingness to 
pay. Subsequent authors (Carl ton 1977, 
Crew and K1eindorfer 1978, Meyer 1975, 
Sherman and Visscher 1978) modified the 
assumptions about the way capacity is 
rationed and changed the way that 
uncertainty enters the demand function. 
They added new constraints to the 
problem and derived solutions for an 
optimal price which is greater than the 
marginal operating costs (Panzar and 
Sibley 1978). The common theme of 
this literature is that the need for 
rationing stems from the rigid price and 
stochastic demand experienced by the 
elec tric ut il i ties, rather than the 
stochastic supply serving the relatively 
stable demand conditions experienced by 
water utilit s and thus the focus of 
the study. Moreover, the electric 
utility studies do not address the 
issue of long run price determination 
consistent with equal quota rationing. 
Theoretical Model: Benefit 
Function Under Rationing 
In this study, economically e ffi-
cient long run prices (kept rigid in the 
short run) are derived consistently with 
quantitative rationing in the context of 
a stochastic water supply. The deriva-
tion follows. 
Assume that there are two groups of 
consumers, with n1 identical members 
in the first and n2 ident ical members 
in the second group. Let their individ-
ual inverse demand functions be D1 and 
D2, respectively. At long run price(s) 
(yet unknown), quantities of water 
demanded by each member of the first and 
* * second groups are q1 and q2 , respec-
tively. Further assume that q1*(P*) 
< q2*(P*). The total ~uantitl of 
water demanded is Q* = n1ql + n2q2 • 
The available water supply is a 
random variable represented by Qs ' 
Let the probability density function of 
Qs be f(Qs)' Whenever Qs falls short 
* of the total demand Q , a quota qr' 
is set for all consumers. 
The following notations are used 
throughout this study: 
1 number of consumer groups i = 
1 , 2, ..• , m. 
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n' 1 
n 
D' 1 
p.* 
1 
Q* 
MCCQ) 
number of consumers in group 
1. 
total number of consumers 
n 
n = E ni· 
i=l 
identical inverse demand 
funct ion of each consumer in 
group i. 
optimal long-run price for 
group 1. 
quantity of water demanded by 
each consumer of group i at 
. * pr1ce Pi . 
total quantity of water 
demanded 
m 
Q* = L 
i=l 
marginal cost of supplying 
water. 
Qs random variab Ie, availab Ie 
water supply. 
f(Qs) probability density function 
of Qs ' 
ration quota for each con-
sumer. 
QR total quantity of water de-
manded at times of rationing. 
The higher the price, the less 
would be the total quantity of water 
demanded, and the lower would be the 
probability that the available water 
supply, which is stochastic, falls short 
of the total quantity demanded at any 
given time, and the lower would be the 
probability of the need for resorting to 
rationing. 
On the other hand, the higher the 
price of water, the lower would be the 
total quantity demanded. Therefore, the 
probability that available water supply 
will exceed the total quantity of water 
demanded wi 11 be higher. Thus, the 
probability of foregone consumers' and 
producers' surpluses will be relatively 
higher. 
In order to balance the two effects 
and arrive at optimal prices, the 
procedure is to maximize the sum of the 
expected producers' and consumers' 
surpluses. Because of the small share 
of a typical household budget spent on 
water, the income effect of a price 
change for water is neglected. The 
expec ted surplus can be de fined for a 
situation where there are two groups of 
consumers by the sum of Equations 18, 
19, and 20 (considering progressively 
more severe relationships between supply 
and demand as the supply varies over 
time) below: 
+ 
Jqr IQr n 2 (D2)dQ - MC(Q) dQ o 0 f(Q )dQ s s 
• (18) 
+ 
Jqr JQr n2 (D 2)dQ - MC(Q) dQ o 0 f(Q )dQ s s 
• (19) 
f'" jqt jqz* n l (Dl)dQ + nZ (D2)dQ Q* 0 0 
Q* f MC(Q) dQ 
o 
f(Q )dQ 
s s 
• (20) 
Equation'18 is the expected surplus 
when 0 i Qs i (nl + n2) ql* or the case 
where the ration allotment is binding 
for both groups of consumers. E~uation 
19 pertains when (nl + n2) q1 < Qs 
< ~ -_ Q or the drought is not severe enough 
for the ration allotment to be binding 
for consumers in the first group, but it 
is binding for consumers in the second 
group. Equation 20 represents the 
expected surplus when the, available 
water supply exceeds the total quantity 
of water demanded, Q*. Therefore, there 
is no need for rationing, 
Two different methods of deter-
mining the uniform ration quota qr are 
explained below. In one scheme, qr 
is determined by dividing available 
water supply by the total number of 
consumers. Under this scheme some of 
the available water may not be used even 
though rationing is restricting use. In 
scheme II, qr is varied as the avail-
able water supply falls so that the 
water supply is always exhausted during 
rationing. 
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Rationing Scheme I 
In this case, the ration quota is 
determined by the rule qr = Qs/(nl + 
n 2) . Th e a va i lab lew ate r sup ply i s 
divided by the total number of house-
holds, irrespective of the level of 
Qs ' When 0 i Qs i (nl + n2)ql *, this 
ration quota will be binding for con-
sumers in both groups, because 0 < 
[Qs/(n1 + n2)] < q1* < q2*' Therefore, 
all of the available water supply Qs 
would be exhausted, and Qi = Qs ' How-
ever, when (nl + n2) ql ~ Qs ~ Q*, 
the ration quota will not be binding for 
consumers in the first group, because 
ql* < [Qs/(nl + n2)]. Therefore, the 
available water supply Qs will not 
* be exhausted, and Qr = n1q1 + n2qr 
< Qs' 
To extend this model over a number 
of groups of consumers, suppose that 
there are m groups of consumers with 
individual demand functions of the form 
Di, i = 1, 2, 3, .,,' m. At Q* each 
consuming unit demands qi*(P*), and 
the ordering of qi* are such that 
ql*(P*) < q2*(P*) < q3*(P*) < ..... . 
< qm*(P*) 
Each group has ni consumers. Define n 
= n 1 + n 2 + ••• + nm a s the tot a 1 
number of households. The rat ion quota 
is set equal to qr = Qs/ n whenever 
Qs falls short of Q*. With these 
assumptions, the expected surplus, ES, 
could be defined as the sum of Equations 
21 through 24: 
+ 11 •••• I qr + n (D )dQ m m 
JQr MC(Q)dQ o 
o 
f(Q )dQ 
s s 
• (21) 
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I qr + n (D )dQ m m o I Qr . MC(Q)dQ f(Q )dQ s s o 
. (22) 
+ .... + n. + 
J 
Jqr + n (D )dQ m m o 
JQr - MC(Q)dQ o f(Q )dQ s s . (23) 
n I ql(*D )dQ + n 2 foq2(:2)dQ + 1 0 1 Jr. 
. . . .. + 
Q* f MC(Q)dQ 
o 
f(Q )dQ 
s s 
. (24) 
Equation 21 shows the portion of 
the expected surplus when 0 < Qs < 
nql *. The ration quota qr is binding 
for consumers in all m groups, because 
(Qs/n) i qI* < q2* < .••. < qm* and 
therefore Qr = Qs ' Equation 22 shows 
the portion of the expected surplus when 
nqI* i Qs i nQ2*' In this case, rati?n 
quota is not binding for consumers ~n 
the first group, but it is binding for 
consumers in all other groups, because 
qI* < (Qs/n) < q2* < ..•• < qm*, and 
therefore Qr -;, nIql* + (n2 + + 
Um)qr' 
Equation 23 shows the fort ion of 
expected surplus when nqj i -Qs i 
Q*, and therefore the rat~on quota is 
not binding for consumers ~n groups I, 
2, ••• , j; but it is binding for con-
sumers in groups j + 1, •.. , m; because: 
* < * i qj+l <... qm 
* * and therefore Qr = nlql + n2q2 + .•. + 
n·q·* + (n'+1 + ... + Um)qr' In order d) Jfind /, the demand functions of 
consumers in all m groups are assumed to 
be linear and have a common intercept 
term, with different slopes. The 
inverse demand functions will be of the 
form Pi == a - i3 i q. Th e qua n tit y 
demanded by the ith group consumer is 
qi * ki Q"I( where 
I 
== 
S. 
1 (:: + ;~ + .... + ::) 
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* < * When nqj i Qs _ Q or 
qj: i (Qs/~) i (Q* In), 
that (Q In) ~ qj . 
it implies 
Upon substituting kj Q* for qj* 
above inequality becomes 
> kj-l > > 
the 
This suggests that j can be determined 
by 
I 
n 
k = Min {l -k i ; I j inn k > o} i-
Equation 24 shows the expected 
* h' surplus when Qs > Q. In t ~s case, 
there is no need for nonprice rationing. 
If assumption of equal intercept 
terms is relaxed, then discrete approxi-
mation will be required. The problem 
can be solved using integer programming 
techniques. 
Rationing Scheme II 
In order- to exhaust the available 
water supply under non-price rationing 
(When Qs falls short of Q*), the ration 
quota has to be varied with Qs ' When 
o < Qs < (ni + n2) ql*' then qr = Qs7(nl + n2) would be binding for 
consumers in both groups and therefore 
Qs would be exhausted. When (ni + 
* * * * n2) qi .s. Qs .s. Q == *nl qi + n2q2 , 
then q == (Qs - nIql )/n2 would not 
r . h f' be binding for consumers ln t e ust 
group, but would be binding for con-
sumers in the second group. This would 
lead to the exhaust ion of availab Ie 
water supply, because unlike scheme I, 
determination of qr is made based 
on the fact that it would not be binding 
for consumers of the first group. 
Therefore, in this scheme Qr would 
al ways be equal to Qs ' The mode I can 
be extended to m groups of consumers 
under the same assumptions as rationing 
scheme 1. 
The expected surplus, ES, would be 
defined by the sum of Equations 25 
through 29: 
{Qr'l fqr 1 
+ n ~D )dQ + n3 (D 3)dQ + m m 
0 0 
JQs o MC(Q)dQ f(Q )dQ s s • (Z5) 
m 
lf
nlqt + L 
1=Z 
n • q * 1 1 
i=l 
j qr 2 Jqr 2 nZ ~D2)dQ + n3 ~D3)dQ 
o 0 
jqr Z + .... + n ~D )dQ m m 
o 
jQs MC(Q)dQ 
o 
f(Q )dQ 
s s 
m 
* * I Inl~l + nzqz + 1=3 
m 
+L n1 . q * n1ql Z 
1=Z 
n • 1 
. . . .. + 
l qr 3 n ~D )dQ m m o I
Q
s 
- 0 MC(Q)dQ 
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• (26) 
* q3 
£(Q )dQ 
s s 
• (Z7) 
...... + 
n ~n )dQ Jqr m m m 
JQs MC(Q)dQ a f(Q )dQ s s 
+ ...... 
q * 
+ n J m(n )dQ 
m m 
a 
JQ* MC(Q)dQ o f(Q )dQ s s 
a 
• (28) 
(29) 
In Equation 25, when 
m 
0 .s. Qs i E n' ql* = (nl+n2+ ~ 
i=l 
+ Urn) ql*; 
the ration quota is set equal to 
n 
m 
... 
and 
* * qr,l .s. ql < q2 < .•• 
< qm* 
and as it is binding for consumers in 
the first group, it is also binding 
for consumers ~n all groups. 
i . e . , 
In Equation 26, when 
m 
E 
i=l 
m 
+ l: 
i=2 
when (nl + nz + ••• + 
the ration quota is set equal to 
The lower and u.fper limits of Qs would 
imply that ql < qr 2 < ·q2* < q3* 
* '. . < ... < qm , so that rat~on quota ~s 
binding for consumers of all, except the 
first group. 
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In Equation 27, when 
i.e. , when 
* (n2 + Ilm) * nlql + + n3 + .... q2 ~ 
* Qs ..:5. n 1 ql + * n2q2 + 
(n3 + .. ,. ,. + Ilm) * q3 , 
the ration quota is set equal to 
and lower and upper limits of ~s would 
imply that q1* < q2*..:5. qr,3 ~ q3 < •... 
< qm*. The ration quota would be 
binding for consumers of all, except the 
first and second groups. 
In Equation 28, when 
m-2 
l: ni % * + (Ilm-1 + Ilm) ~-t* < Qs 
i=l 
m 
< " *=Q* t.. ni% 
i=l 
i.e., when 
* * nlql + •••• + Ilm-2 qm-2 
+ (nm-1 + nm) qm-l* < Qs 
< n1ql* + .•.• + Ilm qm*; 
the ration quota is set equal to 
n 
m 
- n q * 
m-l m-l 
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The lower and upper 1 imi ts of Qs imply 
that ql* < q2* < .... < qm-1 * ~ qr m ~ 
~*. so that the ration quota is binding 
only for consumers of the last (mth 
group). 
Equation 29 shows the expected 
surplus when the available water supply 
exceeds the total quant it; 0 f wa ter 
demanded at optimal price P. In this 
situation, there is no need for re-
sorting to nonprice rationing schemes. 
Benefit Maximization 
The benefit functions for the two 
rationing schemes 
highly nonlinear. 
funct ions wi thout 
suggest different 
consumer groups. 
presented above are 
Maximization of these 
any constraints would 
prices for di fferent 
If the effect of 
different rates on intramarginal units 
on demand is negligible (Taylor 1975, 
Billings and Agthe 1980), these differ-
ent prices define a multiple block 
rate structure. 
However, by introducing some 
constraints to the problem, uniform 
pricing schedules could alternatively be 
determined. The necessary constraints 
are derived from the individual inverse 
demand functions of different groups. 
Suppose that the inverse demand func-
tions are linear in the regions of 
concern and are of the forms: 
Dl : PI Ct -1 f\ q 
D2 : P2 = <X2 {32 q 
D3: P3 "" <X - 83 q 3 
D 4: P4 = <X - 134 q 4 
In order to have a uniform pricing 
schedule, the prices will have to 
be made equal in the inverse demand 
func t ions, i.e.: 
which would yield the following con-
straints: 
The optimal value of the ES corre-
sponding to the constrained problems 
would be lower than the solutions to 
unconstrained problems. 
As a whole, these models define 
water shortages as a function of price 
and available water supply. The short 
run price rigidity, which is one of the 
characteristics of the water market, is 
incorporated. Under the condition of 
fixed prices in short run, two methods 
of quantity rat ioning are proposed to 
deal with water shortages. Finally, 
economically efficient long run prices 
which are consistent with these ration-
ing rules are derived. 
Description of the 
Case Study Area 
The model developed in the previous 
sect ion was applied to the major water 
retailer in Salt Lake County, namely the 
Water Department in the Salt Lake City 
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Department of Public Utilities. Salt 
Lake County is surrounded on three 
sides by mountains and Great Salt Lake 
on the north. The Wasatch Range forms 
the eastern boundary; the Traverse 
Mountains the southern and the Oquirrh 
Mountains the western boundary. The 
Jordan River, which has poor quality 
water used mainly for industrial and 
agricultural purposes, enters the county 
below the outlet of Utah Lake and flows 
north through Salt Lake County, dividing 
it into eastern and western port ions, 
and terminates in the Great Salt Lake 
(Figure 8). The streams originating in 
the Wasatch Range, which are sources of 
high quality water, provide more than 97 
percent of the surface water supply 
originating in the Salt Lake Valley 
drainage area. The seven major streams 
from north to south are City, Red Butte, 
Emigration, Parleys, Mill, Big Cotton-
wood, and Little Cottonwood Creeks. 
The streams originating in the Oquirrh 
Mountains provide less than 3 percent of 
the surface water supply originating in 
the Salt Lake Valley drainage area. 
Presently, the major source of 
imported water into Salt Lake County 
is from the Deer Creek Reservoir on the 
Provo River. The Central Utah Project 
does not as yet supply any water to Salt 
Lake County. The Bonneville Unit, which 
is part of the Central Utah Project's 
initial phase, will divert Uintah Basin 
wa ter (in eastern Utah) to Bonnevi lIe 
Basin (north-central Utah). Of the 
100,000 acre-feet of municipal and 
industrial water that will be developed, 
70,000 acre-feet will be available for 
Salt Lake County. 
There were nearly 12,000 wells in 
the valley registered with the Utah 
Division of Water Rights in 1969. The 
majority of the wells are located to the 
east of Jordan River where the quality 
of the water is generally high. 
Over 42 percent of Utah's popula-
tion resides in Salt Lake County, which 
is the pr1mary industrial, political, 
and commercial center of the Inter-
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Figure 8. Salt Lake County. 
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mountain West. During the period of 
1960 to 1980, the population in Salt 
Lake County increased 62 percent, to 
620,000, and it is expected to rise to 
nearly 1 million by the turn of the 
century. 
Of the 657,700 acre-feet of water 
withdrawn during 1980 in Salt Lake 
County, 167,700 acre-feet (25.5 percent) 
were used for municipal purposes, 
161,500 acre-feet (24.5 percent) for 
industrial, 294,900 acre-feet (45 
percent) for irrigation, and 33,600 
acre-feet (5 percent) for rural domestic 
and livestock. 
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The- current annual municipal water 
supply in Salt Lake County under average 
precipitation conditions is estimated to 
be 185,000 acre-feet. If this supply 
was to remain the same, it is projected 
that water consumption would exceed 
available supply by 1985 (presumably at 
current prices); and by the year 2000, 
it would exceed supply by nearly 70,000 
acre-feet. About 40 to 50 percent of 
the annual municipal water delivered is 
used outdoors for lawns and gardens 
(Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City et al. 1982). 
The Water Department in the Salt 
Lake City Department of Public Utilities 
(Salt Lake City Water Department) is by 
far the biggest municipal water retailer 
in Salt Lake County. It delivered more 
than 92,000 acre-feet of water to a 
population of nearly 370,000 people 
during 1979-80 water year (including 
daytime work force and tourists). On 
the average, 16.1 percent of it s sup-
plies comes from pumps and artesian 
wells, 1.2 percent from springs, and 
the rest (83 percent) from surface 
source s of wa ter. Bec ause of th is 
large dependency on the stochastically 
variable surface supply, the Salt Lake 
Ci ty Water Department was found ideal 
for this study. Salt Lake City Water 
Department has water rights to City, 
Emigration, Parleys, Mill, Big Cotton-
wood, and Little Cottonwood Creeks. The 
details for these water rights were 
obtained from Sa I t Lake Ci ty Wa ter 
Department. The water right structure 
is quite complicated in terms of the 
time, quantity, and the priority com-
ponents of the water rights. For 
modeling purposes, they were simplified, 
based on past use levels from these 
streams as shown in Table 3. 
Since Salt Lake City Water Depart-
ment has primary rights to most of 
these creeks (for those that it doesn't 
have the primary rights, the share of 
primary right holders to streamflow was 
not significant), this simplification 
seemed to be appropriate and was judged 
to show the actual obtainable water from 
these creeks. 
Seasonal Analysis 
The Salt Lake City Water Department 
maintains an excellent data record 
on monthly water consumption and sources 
of water supply. Average monthly 
water consumptions for the period 
1971-1981 were calculated. The year 
1977 was excluded from this ca1culat ion 
because of rationing measures that were 
imp1 emented for drought mi t iga tion. 
These averages are plotted in Figure 
9. Based on these average s and the 
seasonal analysis performed by Hansen 
and Narayanan (1981), the months of the 
year were divided into growing and non-
growing seasons. May through September 
was judged to be the growing season, 
whereas October through April was 
recognized as the nongrowing season. As 
mentioned earlier, about 40 to 50 
percent of the annual municipal water 
consumption is for outdoor uses. Since 
this outdoor use occurs in the growing 
season, water management is more criti-
cal for the growing season months than 
for the nongrowing season months. In 
other w:>rds, any water shortage would 
most probably occur in the growing 
season, when the demand for water is 
relatively high. 
Based on the data from 1970-1981, 
the amount of water withdrawn from each 
source and its percentage contribution 
to the total water delivered was calcu-
lated for the growing season. These 
percentages for year 1977 (the drought 
Table 3. Water rights of Salt Lake City Water Department. 
Big Little 
Creek City Emigration Parleys Mill Cottonwood Cottonwood 
Water right 
to percentage 
of flow 100% 50% 100% 50% 75% 50% 
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year) and their averages for the whole 
period are shown in Table 4. 
It is interesting to note that 
these percentages were not drastically 
different during the drought of 1977 as 
compared to normal water conditions. 
The major differences were a decline in 
Parley Creek's contribution and corre-
14,800 
14,000 
10,000 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
sponding increases in the Little Cotton-
wood and Deer Creek contributions. 
Demand Estimation 
In order to apply the above theo-
retical model. demand functions are 
needed for several groups of water 
users. Assuming that there are m groups 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
I I 
Growing Season 
Figure 9. Average monthly water consumption (acre-feet). 
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Table 4. Contribution of each source of supply of total water delivered. 
Big Little Deer 
City Emigration Parley's Cottonwood Cottonwood Creek Pump Artesian 
Source Creek Creek Creek Creek Creek Reservoir Wells Wells Springs 
Year 
1977 8% 1.6% 7% 23% 20% 22% 12% 5% 1.4% 
Average 
of 
w 1970-81 8.5% 1.8% 13.2% 24.2% 17.5% 17.4% 12.8% 3.3% 1.3% 
0'\ 
of consumers and that consumers in any 
group have similar demand functions, m 
demand functions are needed. There are 
no available studies on the distribution 
of water demand among consumers within a 
community. However, numerous studies 
estimate the aggregate water demand for 
communities in the United States. For 
example, Hansen and Narayanan (1981) 
estimated the elasticity of demand for 
water in Salt Lake City, Utah, from 
Salt Lake ci ty Water Department data. 
If the demand functions of different 
groups of water users are linear with 
common intercepts, the slopes and 
intercept terms of the demand could be 
estimated using the data for elasticity, 
existing prices, and quantities of water 
consumed by the individual households 
belonging to different groups. 
Hansen and Narayanan (1981) formu-
lated a multivariate time series model 
to study monthly variations in water 
demand. The left-hand side variable in 
their multivariate regression model was 
municipal water demand and the right-
hand s ide contained price, average 
temperature, total precipitation, and 
percentage of daylight hours. They 
applied this model to Salt Lake City 
Water Department data and obtained an 
expression with a high multiple correla-
tion coefficient and F-statistics. 
Also, in ex post forecast, their model 
accuratelypredicted monthly variation 
in municipal water demand. They re-
ported a price elasticity of -0.469, and 
this vlaue is used in estimating the 
demand functions needed in this study. 
Two other sets of data needed for 
estimation of the demand functions are 
the price of water and the distribution 
of quantities of water consumed by 
households at these prices. These data 
were collected from records of the Salt 
Lake City Water Department for the 
growing season of 1981. Salt Lake City 
Water Department has two price struc-
tures, one for customers within the city 
limit and one for customers outside the 
city limit (county customers), 
The price struc ture for the period 
under question is shown in Table 5. 
The marginal prices of $0.25 and $0.37 
per 100 cubic feet were used since 
nearly all the customers used more than 
1000 cu. ft. 
As this study is mainly concerned 
with residential water demand, a random 
sample of size 125 was drawn from meter 
readings of water connections up to 1 
inch served by the Salt Lake City Water 
Department. Sixty-nine of these custom-
ers were in the city limits, and the 
remaining 56 meter readings were in the 
county. The bimonthly meter readings 
were adjusted for and summed to show the 
water consumption during the period of 
May-September 1981. A price of $0.25 
per 100 cubic feet was used as the base 
for calculating the demand function, 
the quantities consumed by customers 
paying the higher county rate were 
adjusted upward by using the price 
elasticity of -0.469 to estimate their 
consumption at the price of $ 0.25 per 
100 cubic feet. The next step was to 
group the consumers according to the 
amount of water they consumed during 
May-September 1981 as shown in Table 
6. 
Table 5. Salt Lake City Water Department 1981 price structure. 
City· $3.50/lst 1000 Cubic Feet $0.25/100 Cubic Feet Extra 
County $5.00/1st 1000 Cubic Feet $0.37/100 Cubic Feet Extra 
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Table 6. Residential consumer groupings by May-September water consumption. 
Group Range Frequency Percent 
in 100 ft3 Total 
0-200 56 45 
200-400 31 25 
400-600 30 25 
600-900 7 5 
Several grouping ranges were tried 
before one was chosen. The grouping 
chosen has equal consumption ranges 
and the standard deviation of each group 
is approxmately the same. This can be 
seen by the increasing ratios of the 
square root of u2 I to u among the 
groups. This ratio is similar to the 
coefficient of variation, with the 
di fference being that the st andard 
deviation (square root of second 
central moment) is replaced by the 
square root of second ordinary moment 
u2' • As shown in Table 6, 45 percent 
of the population is in a group con-
suming an average of 128.27 (l00 ft 3 ), 
25 percent consuming 276.45 000 ft 3), 
25 percent consuming 492.67 000 ft 3 ) 
and 5 percent consuming 735.0 (100 
ft 3), from May through September at a 
given price of $0.25/100 ft 3 • 
Data were also collected from the 
Salt Lake City, Water Department on the 
number of water connections for year 
1981. Table 7 shows numbers of connec-
tions by pipe size for both the city and 
county. There were 72,124 connections 
up to 1 inch. These are assumed to be 
the residential or household customers. 
Dividing proportional to the percentages 
in the random sample reported in Table 
6, the numbers of consumers in the four 
Second 
of Sample Sample Tu2' 
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Mean Moment u 
u lIz' 
128.27 18,814.6 1.07 
276.45 80,664.5 1.03 
492.67 245,967.4 1.007 
735.0 544,857.9 1.004 
groups are n1 = 32,456, n2 = 18,031, 
n3 = 18,031, and n4 = 3,606. 
The data for streamflows, used to 
estimate the water supply probability 
density function, were on an acre-foot 
basis, and all of the demand data were 
converted to acre-feet. A price of 
$0.25/100 cubic feet is equivalent to 
$108.90 per acre-foot, and the mean 
water consumptions for the four groups 
are: 
Group 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Sample Mean of 
of Water Consumption 
(Acre-foot) 
0.2945 
0.6346 
1.1310 
1.6873 
These amounts of water consumption 
at a price of $108',90, with a price 
elasticity of -0.469, imply the fol-
lowing demand functions, which have a 
common intercept term: 
Group 1 (D!) : PI = 341.0962 - 788.44 q 
Group 2 (D2) : P2 = 341.0962 - 365.89 q 
Group 3 (D3): P3 341.0962 - 205.30 q 
Group 4 (D4) : P3 = 341.0962 - 137.61 q 
Table 7. Number of water connections by size (1981). 
Water Connection Size City 
Up to 1 inch 46,969 
I" to 2" 1,556 
2" to 10" 569 
Total 49,094 
Based on these demand functions, 
the estimated water consumption during 
the growing season of 1981, at the given 
price YlOuld be 
4 
r niqi = 47,478.3 acre-feet 
i=l 
The actual water consumption during the 
period was 58,892.7 acre-feet. The 
difference of 11,414.4 acre-feet is 
attributed to water consumption through 
the connections larger than 1 inch that 
were exc luded from the sample in this 
study. However, this is taken care of 
in estimation of available water supply 
by shifting the probability density 
function. 
Supply Estimation 
Since the appropriate data for 
estimating the marginal cost function 
were not available, the marginal cost 
was assumed to equal the average cost. 
The average cost was estimated by 
dividing the total operating expenses by 
total water consumption (production): 
AC (1980) = Total Operating Expenses = 
Total Water Consumption 
9,792,907 
92,207 
= $106.20/acre-foot 
County Total 
25,155 72 ,124 
337 1,893 
82 651 
25,574 74,668 
These data were obtained from the annual 
report of Salt Lake City Water Depart-
ment (1979-1980). 
The model in Chapter II requires 
description of the variable water supply 
with a probability density function. 
Assume that the available water supply, 
Qs, has a transformed beta distribution 
with the following density function: 
f(Q ) = 
s 
(A+B-Q ) 0-1 
s 
o 
for B < Q < A + B 
s 
elsewhere 
This density function limits the m1n1mum 
and maximum water supply to Band 
A+B, respectively. It has a flexible 
functional form and is quite well suited 
to model stochast ic flows. Figure 10 
shows histograms for historical data as 
well as estimated density function. 
This density function has four 
parameters which can be estimated 
by the method of moments. The first 
four ordinary moments of this function 
are given by: 
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I 
u l = B + A y + 
U I A2 (X + l):y 
2 (y + o + l)(y + 6) + 2BA y + 
+ B2 
U I A3 (y + 2)(X + l)y 
3 (y + 0 + 2) (y + 0 + 1) (y + 0) 
2 (X + l)y 
+ 3BA (y + 0 + l)(y + 6) + 
u
4
' = A 4 __ ~(~y+.,;..3::::..:):...;(wX.-:...+-=2.!-).;.-( y,--,+-=l.L) ..l..X :--:-_..,... 
(y+ 0 +3) (y+6+2) (y+6+1) (y+o) 
3 (y+2) (y+l)y 
+ 4BA (y+o+2) (y+o+l) (y+o) 
2 2 (y+l)y 3 v 4 
+ 6B A (y+t;+l) (y+o) + 4B A~+ B 
These four parameters (y, 0, Band 
A can be estimated from the four sample 
moments; however, the solutions may not 
be unique. In order to calculate the 
sample moments, measurements of the 
water supply available to the Salt Lake 
City Water Department during the May 
through September growing seasons was 
obtained for a number of years for which 
data were available. 
In a "Salt Lake County Area-wide 
Water Study,1t prepared by a group of 
engineers for the three major water 
utilities of Salt Lake County (Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake City 
et ale 1982), streamflows for the six 
Wasatch creeks are listed on a monthly 
basis. The Salt Lake City Water Depart-
ment depends largely on these sources. 
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The water rights of the Salt Lake City 
Water Department presented in Table 3 as 
percentages of total streamflow were 
multiplied by the respective water flows 
and the products were summed over 
the six creeks and then over the May-
September months for the period of 
1911-1980. 
The first four ordinary moments 
were calculated from the 70 observa-
tions. In order to estimate the four 
parameters of the density function, the 
sample moments could be equated to the 
population moments in the four equations 
given above. One could solve for the 
four unknown parameters, but the solu-
tion would be difficult. Therefore, it 
was assumed that the lower limit of 
density function, B is equal to zero, 
and the rema1nl.ng three parameters 
were estimated using the first three 
sample moments and the corresponding 
equations. However, the results were 
not satisfactory because the resulting 
density function did not cover about 20 
percent of the observations in the 
sample. A second simplification was 
made by setting the upper limit, A+B, to 
the sample maximum. 
The data for estimation of param-
eters and the estimated values of y and 
o are shown below: 
First sample moment ml' = 69,062.5 
Second sample moment m2' = 5,267,714,560 
B = 0 
A+B = A = sample maximum = 127,210 
{~= and the parameter estimates: " <5 = 3.8340 3.2281 
Presently, Salt Lake City Water 
Department does not use any water 
from Mill Creek for culinary purposes, 
even through it has rights to about 50 
percent of the flow. But, it is ex-
pected that wi th increased demand, and 
specially during times of water short-
age, the Salt Lake City Water Department 
will use its entitlement on Mill Creek. 
Therefore, Mill Creek water was included 
1n the available water supply. 
The nonstochastic portion of the 
availab Ie water supply was then calcu-
lated and used as a shift parameter for 
the probability density function. The 
sources other than the six creeks, 
net of the water consumption unaccounted 
for in demand estimation, were assumed 
nonstochastic. The total water from all 
sources of supply other than the six 
creeks are: 
Maximum water from all pump wells + 
average water from Deer Creek 
Reservoir + average water from 
artesian wells + average water from 
Mt. Olympus Spring + average water 
from Boundary Spring + average 
water from Lower Boundary Spring 
= 9,819.8 + 9,476.6 + 1,804.7 
+ 223.8 + 348.8 + 114.0 
21,787.7 acre-feet 
These data were collected from 
Salt Lake City Water Department usage 
records and estimated for the period of 
1970-1981. Since the water pumped from 
wells is not stochastic and determined 
by the authorities in charge, the 
maximum pumpage during the period 
was used. However, averages were used 
for the other sources. 
The water consumption not included 
in the demand function is the actual 
water consumption during the May-
September months of 1981 minus the water 
consumption estimated from the demand 
function or 11,414.4 acre-feet. 
Therefore, the nonstochastic 
portion of the water supply available to 
residential customers would be 21,787.7 
- 11 ,414.4 or 10,373.3 acre-feet. This 
number was used in shifting the proba-
bility density function to the right. 
The shift adds equally to the lower and 
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upper limits of the density function, 
namely Band A+B, but does not change 
the values of the other two parameters, 
y and <5. This procedure assumes that 
those customers not included in the 
demand estimation, would not be sub-
jected to any rationing at times of 
water shortage. Figure 10 superimposes 
the resulting histogram of water supply 
availab Ie to the Salt Lake Ci ty Water 
Department during May-September on the 
probability density' function fitting a 
beta distribution with the estimated 
parameters. The fit appears reasonable. 
Application of the Model 
and Results 
The model for rationing scheme II, 
developed in Chapter II, was chosen for 
application to the case study area. The 
rationale was that rationing scheme 
II is more efficient than rationing 
scheme I in that it always exhausts the 
available water supply. 
In order to solve the equations, a 
nonlinear optimization program (MINOS) 
wa's utilized. The numerical integration 
for specification of the objective 
function was accomplished through 
the Gauss Quadrature method. Depending 
on whether the problem was constrained 
or unconstrained, and on the nature of 
the constraints, the computer runs took 
11 to 17 seconds of CPU time. 
Block Rate Pricing Results 
The solution gives block rate 
pricing' when there are no constraints 
imposed on the variab les qi IS. The 
only constraints on qi I S were derived 
from the limits of integration, to make 
the lower limit of integration less than 
the upper limit. These amounted to the 
following three constraints: 
ql i q2 
q2 i q3 
q3 i q4 
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Figure 10. Histogram of probability density function for available water supply in 
May-September months (1911-1980). 
Table 8 shows the results calcu-
lated from the demand functions. The 
results are shown for average cost 
of $106.20 as we 11 as for increases of 
10 and 20 percent. The decreasing price 
for groups using more water suggests 
decreasing block rate schedule. 
Should average cost increase hy 10 
percent, the model suggests that the 
price be raised by 8.5 percent for the 
first group, 9 percent for the second, 
9.8 percent for the third and 10 percent 
for consumers of the fourth group. If 
average cost rises by 20 percent, prices 
should be raised by 17.2 percent for the 
first group, 18.1 percent for the 
second, 19.7 percent for the third, and 
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20 percent for consumers of the fourth 
group. 
Another analysis examined the 
effects of shifts in the density func-
tion of the available water supply, 
while keeping the average cost at 
$106.20. If the density functions were 
shifted to the left (assuming no firm 
water supply), the lower limit would be 
zero, and the upper limit would be 
127,210 acre-feet. On the other hand 
if Salt Lake City Water Department 
was to acquire some 10,000 acre-feet of 
nonstochastic water supply, perhaps by 
developing more wells, the probability 
density function would shift to the 
right by this amount. The results of 
Table 8. Block rate pricing results for three different levels of average cost.a,b 
AC $106.20 AC = $116.82 AC = $127.44 
(10% increase in AC) (20% l.ncrease in AC) 
q p q p q P 
Group 1 0.291 $111.66 0.279 $120.99 0.267 $130.65 
Group 2 0.632 $109.85 0.605 $119.58 0.578 $129.59 
Group 3 1.141 $106.85 1.090 $117.24 1.039 $127.77 
Group 4 1. 707 $106.20 1.630 $116.82 1.553 $127.44 
Total 
demand 
Value of 
Objective 
function 
47,594 
$5,604,754 
45,515 43,420 
$5,117,119 $4,649,832 
aQuantities demanded qi are all in acre-feet. 
bCosts and prices are all per acre-foot. 
these two cases are presented in Table 
9. 
The results show that a shift of 
the density function. to the left would 
increase the optimal prices and that a 
shift to the right would decrease 
the optimal prices charged to all the 
consumers except those in Group IV. 
Table 10 shows rationing rules by water 
supply ranges and the probabilities 
associated with them. It also shows the 
groupe s) for which the rat ion quota is 
binding. These rationing rules and 
ranges of water supply are derived for 
AC = $106.20. According to the top row 
in the table, rationing for the ordinary 
residential water user would only be 
necessary for the 1000-year (0.10 
percent probability) drought. 
Uniform Rate Pricing Results 
In order to derive an optimal 
un i form pr ice for consumers of all 
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groups, the objective function was 
constrained and then solved. The 
following three constraints were derived 
from the four ind ividual household 
demand func t ions and used for prob lem 
solution. 
Constraint 1: 2.15486 q1 - q2 = 0.0 
Constraint 2: 1.78222 q2 - q3 = 0.0 
Constraint 3: 1.49190 q3 - q4 = 0.0 
Solutions of the constrained 
problem, along with the uniform optimal 
prices, are shown in Table 11 for 
original average cost of $106.20, as 
well as for the increases in average 
cost of 10 and 20 percent. These 
results suggest that if average cost 
increases by 10 percent, the price 
charged to consumers should be raised by 
9.3 percent, and if average cost in-
creases by 20 percent, price should be 
raised by 18.8 percent. 
Table 9. Block rate pricing results: shifts in probability density function of 
water supply.a 
(Shift to Left) (Shift to Right) 
0.0.s. Qs .s. 127,210 20,373.3.s. Qs .s. 147,583.3 
q p q P 
Group 1 0.283 $118.12 0.296 $107.84 
Group 2 0.623 $112.91 0.638 $107.56 
Group 3 1.140 $107.11 1.143 $106.46 
Group 4 1. 707 $106.20 1.707 $106.20 
Total 
demand 
Value of 
objective 
function 
47,130 
$5,512,020 
47,873 
$5,637,588 
aQuantities are all in acre-feet and prices and average costs are all per acre-
foot. 
Table 12 depicts the situations for 
uniform pricing when the probability 
density function of available water 
supply shifts to the left and right by 
the same amounts used for the block rate 
pricing case. The average cost was kept 
at the original level of $106.20. 
Table 13 shows the rationing rules 
according to the ranges of available 
water supply, the groups for which 
rationing is binding, and the proba-
bilities associated with these ranges. 
It can be concluded from Tables 10 
and 13 that the probability of the water 
supply falling short of the total 
demand is about 8.6 percent. On an 
average, a water shortage is likely to 
occur about every 12 years for the 
suggested pricing scheme. 
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Conclusions and Suggestions 
for Further Research 
I f the marke t s for res ident ial 
water were not characterized by price 
rigidity, an instantaneous price adjust-
ment process would have always equated 
the total quantity demanded with avail~ 
able water supply. In order to account 
for the stochastic nature of surface 
water supply, the expected surplus was 
defined as: 
ES = 
Table 10. Rationing rules for the block rate pricing problem according to the 
range of available water supply.a 
Range of Water Supply 
(acre- feet) 
10,373.3 < Qs < 21,001.8 
21,001.8 i Qs i 34,538.9 
34,538.9 i Qs i 45,554.5 
45,554.5 i Qs i 47,593.7 
47,593.7 i Qs i 137,583.3 
aQuantities are all in acre-feet. 
+lA+B 
Q* 
Q* Q* 
Probabil ity 
(Percent) 
0.10 
1.96 
5.19 
1.43 
91.4 
Rationing Rule 
qr = 72 124 , 
(Binding for consumers 
of all 4 groups) 
Q - 9,450.9 
s 
39,668 
(Binding for consumers 
of groups 2, 3, and 4) 
Q - 20,854.6 
_ --=8---",..,.---:-::-::--__ 
qr - 21,637 
(Binding for consumers 
of groups 3 and 4) 
Q - 41,438 
qr = 8 3,606 
(Binding for consumers 
of the last group) 
No rationing needed 
and the other arguments are the same as 
defined before. Solving this problem 
gives 
Q = 48,035 acre-feet 
ES = $5,620,:pO J P(Q)dQ - I MC(Q) f(Q )dQ 8 S which suggests the optimal price to be P = $106.20/ acre-feet or the same as the average cost. Therefore in absence of 
price rigidity, the solutions for the 
stochastic and deterministic problems 
are the same. 
o 0 
where P(Q) ~s the inverse market demand 
function 
P = 341.0962 - 0.00489 Q 
45 
The difference between the value of 
the objective function with flexible 
Table 11. Uniform rate pricing results for three different levels of average 
cost.a,b 
AC - $106.20 AC = $116.82 AC = $127.44 
00% increase in AC) (20% increase in AC) 
Uniform 
Price: P $108.43 $118.56 $128.79 
ql 0.295 0.282 0.269 
q2 0.636 0.608 0.580 
q3 1.133 1.084 1.034 
% 1.691 1.617 1.543 
Total 
demand 47,574 45,502 43,412 
Value of 
object ive 5,604,339 5,116,862 4,649,677 
function 
aA11 quantities are in acre-feet. 
bCos t sand pr ic es are all per ac re-foot . 
Table 12. Uniform rate pricing results: shifts in probability density function of 
water supply.a,b 
(Shift to left) (Shift to Right) 
0.0 ~ Qs ~ 127,210 20,373.3 i Qs ~ 147,583.3 
Uniform 
Price: P $110.99 $106.98 
ql 0.292 0.297 
q2 0.629 0.640 
q3 1.120 1.140 
q4 1.672 1. 701 
Total 
demand 47,052 47,870 
Value of 
objective 5,510,080 5,637,545 
functio'n 
aAll quantities are in acre-feet. 
beosts and prices are all per acre-foot. 
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Table 13. Rationing rules for the uniform rate pricing problem according to the 
ranges of available water supply.a 
Range of Water Supply 
(acre-feet) 
Probability 
(Percent) 
Rationing Rule 
10,373.3 < Qs < 21,276.6 0.12 
Q
s qr = 
72,124 
(Binding for consumers 
of all 4 groups) 
21,276.6 ~ Qs ~ 34,803.4 2.03 
Q - 9,574.5 
qr = s 39,668 
(Binding for consumers 
of groups 2, 3, and 4) 
34,803.4 ~ Qs ~ 45,557.0 5.12 
Q - 21,042.2 
qr = s 21,637 
(Binding for consumers 
of groups 3 and 4) 
Q - 41,471.4 
45,557.0 ~ Qs ~ 47,574.0 1.41 qr - -.::!s_-:--___ ---
47,574.0 ~ Qs ~ 137,583.3 91.4 
aQuantities are all in acre-feet. 
prl.cl.ng ($5,620,370) and the value of 
objective function for rigid uniform 
pricing ($5,604,339) is $16,030. This 
amount can be regarded as the we Ifare 
cost of price rigidity and associated 
quantity rationing. 
Block rate pricing is becoming a 
common rate structure for public 
utilities. When "such block system 
is used marginal values in use will 
not in general be equated between 
individuals; some will tend to consume 
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3,606 
(Binding for consumers 
of the last (4th) group) 
No rationing needed 
an amount such that they end up in the 
higher-priced block and others will end 
up in the lower" (Hirshliefer et al. 
1960, p. 45). One interesting result 
of this study is the suggestion of 
decreasing block rates for water. A 
price schedule with decreasing block 
rates implies that the consumer is, in 
effect, facing a downward sloping supply 
schedule (Taylor 1975). Converting the 
results of Table 8 to a 100 cubic foot 
basis, which is the unit used by Salt 
Lake City Water Department, the model 
suggests the 
for monthly 
following price schedule 
wa ter sal es d ur ing the 
growing season: 
Price/IOO 
cubic feet 
$0.256 
$0.250· 
$0.245 
$0.243 
Monthly 
Water Consumption 
up to 25 (100 ft 3) 
up to 55 (100 ft 3) 
up to 96 (100 ft 3 ) 
up to 149 (100 ft 3 ) 
However, considering the administrative 
costs of calculating consumer bills with 
different rates and the small difference 
bet we en the val u e s 0 f the 0 b j e c t i v e 
functions for block rate pricing and 
uniform pricing in Tables 8 and 11, 
block rate pricing is not justified. 
The uniform pricing result of 
$108.43 per acre-foot is equi va lent 
to $0.249 per 100 cubic feet, which is 
very close to the price of $0.25 per 100 
cubic feet charged to consumers at the 
time by Salt Lake City Water Department. 
Therefore, this study concludes that the 
existing pricing policies of Salt Lake 
City Water Department are optimal, 
even when we bring the price r igidi ty 
and stochastic water supply into the 
scenario of price determination. 
The models outlined in this study 
propose second best type solutions to 
allocating water at times of shortage 
under price rigidity. The rationing 
rules derived conform to the actual 
policies pursued by many water supply 
utilities during shortages. 
Most drought indices provide some 
physical measurement of drought that is 
exogenous to the socio-economic system. 
In contrast, the models presented in 
this study define drought as an endoge-
nous variable. After selecting the 
optimal long run prices, drought is 
defined as the cases where water supply 
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Qs falls short of Q*, the total quantity 
of water demanded at these optimal 
prices. This definition is more sui t-
able for policy purposes and follows 
the principle suggested by Howe et a1. 
(1980, p. 4) of entering the expectation 
of water users into the definition of 
drought. 
Another characteristic of the 
mode 1 sis that t he price charged to 
consumers would be greater than marginal 
cost in order to minimize the we lfare 
loss resulting from rationing. The 
greater the welfare loss of rationing, 
the more the deviation from marginal 
cos t. Rationing scheme I has greater 
welfare losses (due to cases of non-
exhaustion of water supply at times of 
rationing) than does rationing scheme 
II. Had rationing scheme I been applied 
in this study, it would· have given 
higher prices. 
One direction for further research 
would be to examine the effect of 
reservoirs for water storage. In this 
case, calculation of Qs' the available 
water supply for each period, would add 
the amount of water in the reservoir at 
the beginning of the period to the 
amount of runoff during the period. 
Another study could examine mUltiple 
sources of supply. If consumers of 
different localities were to be served 
from different sources, separate proba-
bility density functions would be 
needed. 
On the demand side, more effort 
could be placed on estimation of mul-
tiple group demand functions and on 
rationing rules based on a percentage of 
previous use. If the agricultural, 
industrial, and municipal demand func-
tions for water could be estimated 
separately, the model could be used for 
optimal intersectoral allocation of 
water. 
CHAPTER IV 
ESTIMATED INEFFICIENCIES OF SHORT-TERM WATER 
RESOURCES IMMOBILITY DURING DROUGHT 
Introduc 
Short-term Resources Immobility 
The net economic benefits of 
resource use equal the total benefits 
less cost, a difference that can be 
divided between consumers I and pro-
ducers I surplus. Price theory shows 
that optimal resource allocation occurs 
when the shadow price of the resource 
equals the marginal cost value of 
supplying it to each economic sector. 
This classical microeconomics tenet 
rest s upon a number of as sumpt ions 
(James and Lee 1971, Ch. 3), including: 
1. Abs ence of art ific ial con-
straints on prices by government, 
labor, business, or other institutions. 
2. Free movement of the resource 
between markets or sectors. 
3. Perfect information throughout 
the market regarding the price of the 
resource. 
4. Full employment 0 f t he re-
source. 
These conditions are rarely met, but 
are frequently assumed as a basis 
for jUdging the efficiency of actual 
markets. When the above assumpti~ns 
are violated, the resource is not free 
to travel from lower-valued uses to 
higher-valued uses. This situation, 
of course, represents an inefficient 
allocation of the resource. 
In the western states, various 
institutions dealing with the allocation 
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of water rights and the pricing of water 
have evolved which, at least in the 
short-run, violate one or more of the 
above assumptions. In particular, most 
states enforce the appropriations 
doctrine through institutional and legal 
restrictions on the sale of water or the 
intersectoral transfer of water rights 
that effectively retard the rate at 
which such transactions can occur. 
Another common problem is fixed or 
lagging water prices. These typically 
understate the real value of the re-
source and thereby widen the gap between 
supply and demand. During a period of 
water scarcity, these kinds of short-
term restrictions tend to reduce con-
sumer benefits. This chapter estimates 
such losses during a recent drought in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Problems in Estimation of 
Efficiency Costs of Immobility 
The efficiency costs of water 
resour!Ces immobility can be estimated 
by comparing the benefits that would 
theoretically accrue to water users 
if the resource were being allocated 
according to free market assumptions 
to the benefits in fact observed under 
actual conditions. 
If benefits are measured as the sum 
of consumer and producer surplus, one 
needs supply and demand curves. Ob-
taining expressions for supply and 
demand is made difficult by a variety of 
factors. First, demand for water shifts 
seasonally. Some causes of the shift 
may be stochastic in character (e.g., 
temperature and precipitation), thus 
yielding stochastic demand curves and 
necessitating estimation of consumer 
surplus as expected values. Also, 
during a drought situation, regulatory 
water conservation measures are fre-
quently imposed and temporarily shift 
the demand curve. Quantitative descrip-
tion of these artificial shifts is quite 
difficult. 
A second set of difficulties 
surrounds estimation of the resource 
supply. By its very nature, the hydro-
logic system is stochastic, and predic-
tion of future levels of streamflow, for 
example, ~s an imprecise science. 
Again, one is forced to resort to 
estimation of expected values in order 
to for-ecast producer surplus. 
Nature of the Research 
This chapter documents an applica-
tion of a nonlinear optimization model 
to estimate optimal water allocations 
during the 1976-77 drought in Salt Lake 
County. The optimal policy according to 
the model was contrasted to the actual 
water allocations observed during the 
drought to estimate the inefficiences 
produced by certain nonmarket controls. 
The following sections of the chapter: 
1) review the reasons for short-term 
immobility of water resources, 2) 
describe the optimization model, the 
policy options it explores, and its 
specific formulation for Salt Lake 
County, 3) present the results of the 
modeling efforts, and 4) draw con-
clusions. 
Factors Affecting Water Allocation 
and Use During Drought 
Legal Considerations 
The Appropriations Doctrine. In 
arid climates throughout the world, one 
version or another of the appropriations 
doctrine is frequently followed in the 
allocation of water rights. The appro-
priations doctrine has been adopted in 
most of the western states. The purpose 
of the appropriations doctrine is to 
protect investments in water resources 
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development in the face of a stochastic 
water supply. Some others have argued 
that in application, however, the 
appropriations doctrine frequently leads 
to inefficient water use. For example, 
Meyers and Tarlock (1980) believe that 
appropriative rights are not easily 
transferred between economic sectors due 
to the lack of any well-defined market. 
They con tend tha t wa ter righ t s are 
simply not bought and sold freely. 
A more severe criticism of the 
appropriations doctrine, especially 
from the standpoint of efficient water 
use in times of comparative scarcity, 
has been raised against the "firs t in 
time, first in right" clause (Meyers and 
Tarlock 1980). Under this mechanism, 
appropriators are senior and junior to 
one another along a sc ale from the 
oldest appropriation to the youngest. 
In times of water shortage, junior 
rights drop out first and lose every-
thing before the next senior right 
loses anything. This fai Is to spread 
the economic risk inherent in the 
randomness of the water supply and 
violates two basic economic principles. 
The first involves marginal produc-
tivity. A junior appropriator who 
loses all his water also loses marginal 
units of high productivity, while 
a senior appropriator ret ains marginal 
units of low productivity. The second 
involves the pooling of risk. Meyers 
and Tarlock (1980) contend that under 
the appropriation doctrine, the individ-
ual rights are defined in such a way 
that the aggregate variability of supply 
is greater than that which nature 
mposes. The risks incurred in water 
resources development are distributed 
unequally. 
Both criticisms of the appropri-
ation doctrine posed above may be 
misdirected. First, although there 
does appear to be immobility in water 
right markets, the cause appears to be 
mostly due to delays in approval by 
state water right engineers which are 
required for administrative review of 
changes ~n location or type of use. 
Although some delays are inevitable, 
the alternative to the appropriative 
doctrine may be a plethora of lawsuits 
--if the psuedo-legal authority of the 
state engineer did not exist--thereby 
causing greater delays. As to the 
junior-senior water right decision rule, 
the criticism above is valid only if one 
assumes that junior users are unable to 
rent or buy water from senior users. At 
any rate, water market immobility does 
appear to exist. An indepth discussion 
. of whether immobility is better or worse 
under the appropriation doctrine vs. 
some other form of water law is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
Application of appropriative rights 
in Utah. As applied in most states, the 
appropriations doctrine allows the owner 
of a water right to sell the right to 
another. The new owner may then change 
the point ·of diversion or transfer the 
right to a different place or kind of 
use subject to an administrative review 
designed to protect other water users 
from any adverse effects that may 
result. However, smooth operation of 
the water rights transfer process is 
frequently impeded (perhaps for good 
reason) by legal and institutfonal 
obs tac les (see Meyers and Tarlock 1980 
and National Water Commission 1973). In 
part icular, the administrat ive pro-
ceedings required by most states pre-
clude the rapid transfer of rights to 
meet the demands of higher-valued uses 
1n times of drought. 
In Utah, the transfer of water 
rights (or even the sale of water 
by one sector to another in substantial 
quant it ies) is accompl ished through 
procedures analogous to those pertaining 
to applications to appropriate- water 
(Hutchins and Jensen 1965). These 
procedures require: 
1. Written application to the 
state engineer requesting the trans fer. 
2. Publication of notice of 
application. 
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3. Passage of sufficient time to 
allow protests, if any, to be filed. 
4. Cons ideration of the appl ica-
tion and any protests by the state 
engineer before announcement of approval 
or rejection of the transfer request. 
The state engineer's determination is 
final, subject to judicial review. 
Accomplishing these steps may take some 
months, espec ially if junior water 
rights in return flow are involved. 
During a severe drought, passage of this 
much time could conceivably result in 
considerable economic loss. Water 
rights brokering services have been 
proposed (Bagley et al. 1980) as a 
mechanism for facilitating the transfer 
process, but at present no such service 
is available. 
Water Pricing Policies 
Demand management in the municipal 
and industrial sector. It is common for 
municipal and industrial (M&I) water 
supply systems to charge uniform rates 
over time. However, M&I water demands 
typically show considerable temporal 
variability (Linaweaver et al. 1966) as 
they vary with seasonal water use. In 
spite of the fact that the M&I sector is 
particularly amenable to demand regula-
tion through pricing (Le., the bene-
ficiaries of the service are easily 
identified and those not willing to pay 
can be easily excluded), peak-load 
pricing policies are not widely used. 
In a series of pub lications, Davis and 
Hanke have stressed the advantages of 
seasonal peak load rates (see Davis and 
Hanke 1971, 1972; Hanke and Davis 1971; 
Hanke 1972). 
Water supply charges are also 
commonly held constant over space 
as well as time. Since the cost of 
delivering water is a function of 
these variables, water prices should be 
established with reference to distance 
from the supply, population, density, 
and elevation (see Hanke 1972, Gaffney 
1969, Vickrey 1969), 
The water pr~c~ng options available 
for drought management may be analyzed 
from the standpoint of microeconomic 
theory (Whipple 1981). First, in an 
economically efficient system, the 
cos t 0 f e a c h good will ref 1 e c t the 
opportunity cost to society of using 
scarce resources to produce that good. 
During a normal period, the supply curve 
for water may be represented by 81 in 
Figure 11. The demand for water is 
given by curve Dl. When a drought 
occurs, the decline in water supply can 
be illustrated by a leftward shift 1n 
the supply curve to 82. As seen from 
Figure 11, if price ~s to remain con-
stant, then measures must be taken that 
either increase the supply of water 
(thereby moving 82 toward 81), or 
reduce the demand for water (shifting 
Dl toward D2)' A third option, of 
course, is to increase price from PI 
toward P2' 
If supply could be restored to the 
81 level, then the quantity of water 
sup p 1 i e d at p ric e P 1 wo u 1 d b e Q 1 . 
However, during a severe drought it is 
generally difficult to implement major 
l&J 
U 
-0:: 
a.. 
"-I- P2 
(f) 
o PI 
U 
.....J 
« 
Z 
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« 
:E 
a 
QUANTITY OF WATER 
Figure 11. 8upply and demand functions 
for water. 
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structural measures quickly. Outside of 
emergency drilling of wells and repair 
of leaks, relatively little can be done 
structurally to increase water supply. 
A nonstructural alternative would be for 
. higher-valued users to purchase water 
from lower-valued users. This alterna-
tive, however, is complicated by the 
institutional inertia discussed in the 
previous section. 
Increasing the price of water from 
PIt 0 P 2 wo u 1 d red u c e the qua n tit y 
of wa ter demanded to Q2' However, 
price increases are frequently difficult 
to apply due to institutional and 
political reasons (Whipple 1981). 
Reduc t ion in demand dur ing periods 
of d r 0 ug h t , the ref 0 r e , ~ s the mo r e 
common policy. From an efficiency 
viewpoint, however. involuntary demand 
reduction results in a loss of consumer 
benefit as compared to a policy equating 
marginal benefits and costs. From 
Figure 11, the loss in consumer and 
producer benefits induced by adopting an 
involuntary demand reduction policy 
rather than a policy that increases 
price from PI to P2 is equal to the 
area above the 82 supply curve wi thin 
the triangle labeled "abc". 
Marginal cost pricing in the 
agricultural sector. In a stinging 
cr~t~c~sm of irrigation water pr~c~ng 
policies, Hanke and Davis (1973) identi-
fy several ways by which alternative 
pricing schemes could be employed to 
inc reas e the ec onomi c e ff ic iency of 
irrigation. These include establishing 
prices as a funct ion of actual oppor-
tunity cost and realistic interest rates 
and relating prices to seasonal changes 
in supply and demand conditions. In 
general, Hanke and Davis (1973) follow 
Gaffney (1962) in advocating stream-
lining the market for water rights. 
In principle, the marginal cost-
marginal price analysis of a leftward 
shift in supply offered in the previous 
section applies to the agricultural 
sector as well as to M&I. However, 
only a radical shi ft from the current 
"ability-to-pay" pricing criterion to a 
policy of cost-based pricing and the 
introduction of a working market for 
water rights will make it possible for 
water pricing alternatives to contribute 
to drought management in the agri-
cultural sector. Institutional and 
political constraints presently preclude 
the application of effective pricing 
policies for irrigation water, even 
through increased social gains might 
result (Howitt et a1. 1980, Kelso 
1967 ). 
A Case Study: The 1977 Drought 
in Salt Lake County, Utah 
During the 1977 water year, much of 
the U.S. suffered a severe drought. In 
Salt Lake County the surface waters 
generally used for M&I supply were 
drast ically reduced, and a variety of 
water conservation programs were enacted 
to decrease demand. The only sub-
stantial supply augmentation attempted 
was the drilling of new wells and 
increased pumping of existing wells. 
Relatively little was done from a 
drought management standpoint to change 
the allocation of water among sectors or 
to adjust water prices. Consequently, 
the response of Salt Lake County to the 
1977 drought is a good candidate for 
contrasts with the response that would 
be expected in a true water market 
situation, where water management would 
be less dominated by short-run rigidity 
in water transfers and price adjust-
ments. Salt Lake County also represents 
a good case study area because of 
relatively good data on municipal water 
supply and stream flow. 
The Study Area 
Overview. Salt Lake County covers 
an area of 764 square miles, of which 65 
percent is valley and the rest is 
mountainous terrain. On the east side 
of the county, the Wa sa tch Mount ai n 
Range rises to elevations in excess of 
11,000 feet. The Oquirrh Mountains 
border the county on the west, rising 
to 9,500 feet. Annual prec ipitation on 
the valley floor normally ranges from 12 
to 16 inches. The county was originally 
settled by Mormon pioneers in 1847, who 
immediately began diverting water from 
mountain streams for irrigation. 
Winter storms in the Wasatch 
Mountains produce accumulations of 
snow which result in high runoff from 
spring snowmelt. Much of the snowmelt 
a 1 so in f i1 t rat e sin tot h e so i 1 and 
thereby contributes a relatively 
large baseflow component to Wasatch 
Front streams. 
Water resources. On the east side 
of the valley, the seven maj or creeks 
are continuously gaged, with most 
records dating back to the turn of the 
century. Mean annual flow from these 
streams totals approximately 150,000 
acre-feet. Several minor drainages also 
exist on the east side, and there are 
six minor drainages from the Oquirrh 
Range on the west. Because the Wasatch 
Range is much higher than the Oquirrhs, 
and because the catchment s are on the 
windward side of the range, the Wasatch 
catchments receive more precipitation 
than the Oquirrh catchments. 
The single largest source of 
surface inflow into the county is the 
Jordan River, which originates at the 
outlet of Utah Lake and flows north out 
of Utah County into Salt Lake County. 
The annual inflow from the Jordan River 
is about 260,000 acre-feet. The quality 
of water is too poor for municipal use, 
but flows are sui table for irrigation 
and industrial uses. 
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Groundwater in the county is 
obtained through springs and pumped 
wells. The valley subsurface is largely 
unconsolidated and acts as a large 
reservoir. Groundwater utilization is 
increasing, with present usage at about 
100,000 acre-feet annually. Safe yield 
has been estimated at approximately 
150,000 acre-feet. 
Water is imported into Salt Lake 
County from Deer Creek Reservoir on 
the Provo River, from the Provo River 
downstream from the reservoir, and from 
springs in Tooele Valley. The Deer 
Creek and Provo River water is used for 
M&I purposes, the Provo River diversions 
are for both M&I and irrigation, and the 
Tooele Valley imports are used ex-
clusive ly by Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion for smelter and concentrator 
operations. 
Water use. Munic ipal water use in 
Salt Lake County (water deliveries 
for domestic, commercial, fire fighting, 
and public service uses as well as 
potable water from municipal systems 
delivered to the industrial sector) has 
been rising, with withdrawals for 
municipal 'use from 1962 to 1975 in-
creasing by about 4,500 acre-feet 
annually (see Table 14). Annual per 
Table 14. Historical Salt Lake 
water withdrawals 
ac-ft). 
County 
( 1000 
Year Municipal Irrigation Industrial 
1962 197 281 a 
1963 104 271 110 
1964 108 276 a 
1965 100 303 114 
1966 127 359 120 
1967 115 313 127 
1968 III 296 143 
1969 133 312 158 
1970 120 305 153 
1971 140 301 158 
1972 146 306 163 
1973 134 281 177 
1974 160 311 170 
1975 143 277 139 
Average 125 299 144b 
aNot available 
bl2-year average 
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capita withdrawals average approximately 
0.27 acre-feet. Roughly half of the 
annual municipal deliveries is used 
outdoors for lawns and gardens. 
Industrial water use has been 
increasing at a rate of roughly 1000 
acre-feet per year and presently stands 
at about 160,000 acre-feet per year. 
The largest industrial user is Kennecott 
Copper Corporation. 
Agricultural use includes irriga-
tion and stock watering. Diversions 
for irrigation show a slight downward 
trend in recent years, and irrigated 
acreage has undergone a much more 
pronounced decrease (see Tables 14 and 
15). Dividing 1975 irrigation diver-
sions by estimates of the total irri-
gated acreage for that year gives an 
approximate diversion of 7.9 acre-feet 
per acre. A more realistic application, 
considering typical efficiencies and 
water requirements, would be 5 acre-feet 
per acre. 
Optimization Model 
Subregional County Divisions 
In order to achieve as much spatial 
resolution as possible in assessing 
drought impacts, the study area was 
divided into seven subregions as in-
dicated in Figure 12. These subregions 
were chosen following the work by Bishop 
et al. 0974, 1975), Narayanan et al. 
Table 15. Historical Salt Lake County 
irrigated acreage. 
Year 
1935 
1955 
1975 
Irrigated Land 
(1000 acres) 
48 
44 
35 
GREAT 
SALT 
LAKE 
DIVISIONS OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Figure 12. Subregions used in the Salt Lake County case study. 
(976)) and Pratishthananda and Bishop 
0977}. The subregions were formulated 
so as to constitute as coherent a unit 
as possible considering watershed 
subbasins, water supply distribution 
systems) and water district boundaries. 
All water supply and use data for the 
optimization model were specified at the 
subregion level. 
Objective Function 
The objective function used in the 
optimization is maximization of the 
net benefits of water use in the M&I 
and agricultural sectors. 
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Estimation of municipal benefits. 
The total benefits of water use in 
the municipal sector were expressed as 
the sum of the areas under each 0 f 
five municipal demand curves (one for 
each of the months of May through 
September) for each subregion of the 
model. Referring to Figure 13, total 
municipal benefit, MB, can be expressed 
as: 
-CI. ' 
Q rt dQ 
t-
Z 
:::::J 
0:: 
lLJ 
a.. 
O::p 
lLJ 
t-
<t 
3: 
LL. 
0 
lLJ 
U 
0:: 
a.. 
+ Q rt 
-a Po = eM Q r 
rt rt rt 
QUANTITY OF WATER DELIVERED 
TO MUNICIPAL SECTOR 
Figure 13. Estimation of gross municipal benefits. 
where t=l, •••• 5 is an index on months, 
r=l •..•• 7 is an index on county 
subregions, CMrt is a parameter for 
the region determined from monthly 
temperature and precipitation, art is 
the inverse of demand elasticity, and 
Qrt* is the quantity of water delivered 
for the municipal sector in the rth 
subregion in the tth season. 
Demand curves for the municipal 
sec tor we re es t imated from monthly 
precipitation, temperature, and daylight 
hours data as recommended by Hansen 
(1981) and Hansen and Narayanan (1981). 
They propose municipal demand curves 
having the formulation: 
where Dis the natural 1 ogari thm of 
water demand, f31 are coefficients, I 
is the natural logarithm of monthly 
rainfall, T is the logarithm of mean 
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monthly temperature, P is the logarithm 
of marginal price of water, and L is the 
logarithm of the percent of the annual 
daylight hours in the month. The 
weather stations that were selected to 
represent the various subregions are 
listed in Table 16, together with the 
mean precipitations and temperatures for 
the months of May through September as 
well as the values observed in 1977. 
Table 17 presents the demand curves that 
were estimated for the subregions for 
each of the seasons, using both mean and 
1977 temperature and precipitation data. 
Estimation of agricultural bene-
fits. Agricultural benefits are ex-
pressed as gross revenues from the 
sale of commodities less the costs of 
production, exclusive of water delivery 
costs. Farm budgets published in 
the Utah Agricultural Census for 1974 
through 1976 were used to obtain average 
crop product ion c.osts and sale prices. 
These averages were used in the model. 
Table 16. Subregion climatic characteristics. 
Represen- Monthly Temperature (OF) Monthly Precipitation (inches) 
tarive 
Weather Ma:t June Jul:t AUilust Se~tember Ma:t June Jul:t AUilust SeEtember 
Subregion Station Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1917 Mean 1917 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 
D. Magna area Garfield 60.65 55.7 65.81 75.9 79.67 78.0 77 .23 75.8 66.73 66.6 1.64 3.62 1.41 4.76 0.57 3.79 0.72 0.94 1.08 1.73 
E. Salt Lake Salt Lake 59.28 55.0 67.84 73.2 77.13 77.3 74.69 75.0 64.31 66.4 1.38 4.76 1.13 0.06 0.70 0.61 0.89 1.85 0.85 1.85 
City area City Air-
port 
Fl' Hunter- Salt Lake 59.65 55.4 67.90 71.3 76.51 76.2 74.55 74.0 64.81 65.6 1.33 3.79 1.08 0.00 0.88 0.82 0.68 1.49 0.84 1.34 
Granger City Sub-
area urban 
Sewage 
Plant 
Vl 
-...J 
F2. South Salt a a a 
Lake area 
G. Murray a a a 
area 
HI. West Bingham 54.61 52.3 62.88 71.1 72 .51 74.4 70.20 72.4 61.79 64.1 1.92 4.84 1.84 0.43 1.06 1.39 1.16 1.72 1.11 1.90 
Jordan Canyon 
area 
H2. Draper Cottonwood 60.41 55.3 69.29 75.7 79.55 77.9 77.27 75.1 61.80 68.9 2.04 6.77 1.45 0.31 0.67 2.03 1.15 2.12 1.34 3.39 
area Weir 
aSame weather station as FI subregion. 
Table 17. Estimated municipal demand curves by subregion. 
Estimated eM Valuesa 
Sub- Elas- Ma~ June July August September 
region ticityb Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 Mean 1977 
D -0.138 505.83 417.83 574.17 636.92 840.49 693.69 741.11 705.09 504.09 483.08 
E -0.469 51548 42453 63720 86097 82566 83568 73748 70915 52103 52211 
F1 -0.138 2593.4 2131.2 3173.0 6165.5 3941.4 3941.8 3651.5 3379.4 2547.7 2492.5 
F2 -0.469 26770 22352 32878 54704 41262 41181 38392 36149 27111 26844 
G -0.469 23837 19903 29277 48712 36742 36670 34186 32189 24141 23904 
HI -0.138 635.29 551.50 778.86 1053.5 1031.2 1045.7 918.18 928.94 667.07 671. 98 
V1 
00 
H2 -0.138 1610.6 1277.2 2009.0 2605.1 2694.7 2378.8 2320.7 2137.8 1650.5 1561.5 
aDem and for water is expressed as Q = CM p-a where Q is in acre-feet per month t CM is given above, P ~s 
price in dollars per acre-foot t and a is elasticity. 
bFrom Hansen (1981). 
seasonal crop consumptive use require-
ments. 
Results 
Overview of Model Runs 
Five runs were made with the model, 
each representing a different set of 
constraints on the water market as well 
as different assumptions about the 
stochasticity of the hydrologic system. 
The first two runs represent free-market 
responses to drought. The first run 
was made using the iterative approach 
discussed previously, where expected 
values of municipal demand and surface 
supply for future seasons condition 
the solution of each successive itera-
tion. The second run uses the actual 
hydrologic conditions and M&I demands 
for 1977 as inputs. 
The remaining three runs are also 
deterministic in terms of water demands 
and hydrology, but each represents a 
departure from free-market conditions in 
terms of an artific ial shift in the 
demand for water andj or imposition of 
constraints to movement of the resource 
between economic sectors. The third run 
constrains the M&I water use to quanti-
ties approximating those observed 
in Salt Lake County during the 1977 
drought. These quantities were con--
siderably less than normal and resulted 
from the applicati?n of a variety of 
demand reduction techniques. The fourth 
run assumes no demand reduction, but 
requires that the irrigation water 
rights on Wasatch Front streams not 
yet covered by exchange agreements be 
delivered in full to the agricul-
tural sector. Finally, the fifth run 
assumes both demand reduction and 
maintenance of agricultural water rights 
east of the Jordan River. As such, it 
represents an approximation of the 
actual institutional situation that 
prevailed during the drought. Table 21 
summarizes the principal characteristics 
of these five runs. 
Optimization Results 
The solutions were obtained using 
the Modular In-core Nonlinear Optimiza-
tion System, a nonlinear optimization 
package developed by the Department of 
Operations Research, Stanford Univer-
sity. The results are summarized in 
Table 22. The total net benefit from 
water use ranges from $47.86 million for 
run five to $53.23 million for run two. 
The run that performed best represented 
a free-market given perfect knowledge of 
hydrologic conditions. The run which 
produced the least consumer plus pro-
ducer surplus was the most constrained 
in that it limited water movement 
between sectors as well as supplies to 
M&I. In between these extremes, addi-
tional constraints reduced the net 
benefits. 
Table 21. Summary description of model runs. 
Run 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Treatment of Hydrologic 
Conditions 
Stochastic Deterministic 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Constraints Applied to Water Market 
Water 
None tion 
X 
X 
62 
Conserva-
in M&I 
X 
X 
Irrigation Water 
Rights Maintained 
X 
X 
through September). M& I and agricul-
tural demands are also forecast from the 
basis of expected monthly temperatures 
and precipitation amounts. These 
forecast supply and demand quantities 
are put into the model, and a solution 
is obtained. At the end of the next 
month (May), new supply and demand 
quantities can be forecast for the 
remaining months. These new forecasts 
are entered into the model, along with 
the optimal policies (in terms of water 
prices, reservoir releases, etc.) that 
were identified for May. At this point, 
another solution is obtained to find the 
optimal water management policies for 
June, c ondi t ional upon the expected 
values of future supplies and demands. 
The process ~s continued, month-by-
month, with each iteration resulting in 
identification of conditionally optimal 
management policies and new estimations 
of expected future supply and demand 
conditions. 
Expected Values of Random Variables 
A mul t ivariate analysis of the 
sfreamflows from the gaged Wasatch 
Front streams was conducted following 
the procedures recommended by Salas 
et al. (1980, Ch. 7). This analysis was 
performed on monthly streamflow data for 
the water years of 1947 through 1976. 
Identification and estimation of auto-
regressive moving average (ARMA) models 
for the surface supplies was done using 
the Box-Jenkins procedure available on 
the Stat istical Package for the Social 
Sciences. The multivariate model is of 
the form 
where Zt is a vector_of standardized 
flows for season t, Ct is the vector 
of error terms for time t,. and ¢ i and 
0j are, respectively, the autoregres-
s~ve and moving average matrices of lags 
i and j. The procedure recommended by 
Salas et al. (1980) yields a model where 
the q, and e matrices are diagonal, 
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and the cross correlations are 
served in Ct only at lag-zero. 
this approach, Et becomes 
pre-
In 
0
2 B 
C 
where 0 2 is the error variance, St is 
a colufun vector with standardized 
elements that are independent in time 
and space, and B is a square matrix 
that is estimated from B, where 
BBT = M o 
A 
where Me is the lag-zero cross-correla-
tion matrix. 
Table 20 presents the estimated 
values of <p and e for each of the 
surface streams. 
Expected Demands 
The expected municipal demands were 
estimated from mean monthly prec~p~ta­
tion and temperatures. These curves are 
given in Table 17. Expected irrigation 
demands were expressed in the model by 
netting effective precipitation from the 
Table 20. Estimated ARMA coefficients 
for Wasatch Front streams. 
Stream e 
City Creek 0.80453 -0.16475 
Emigration Creek 0.85127 0 
Parleys Creek 0.88258 0.18343 
Mill Creek 0.86700 0 
Big Cottonwood 
Creek 0.57127 -0.26098 
Little Cottonwood 
Creek 0.56091 0 
as representative of the general sea-
sonal probability observed on gaged 
streams for Salt Lake County as a whole 
for the 1977 water year. Limited 
surface water storage is available in 
three small reservoirs in watersheds on 
the Wasatch Front. These reservoirs and 
their capacities are listed in Table 19. 
The model contains storage constraints 
to allow seasonal carry-over consistent 
with the capabilities of these reser-
VOIrs. 
Agricultural production. The model 
includes constraints which express 
agricultural production and water 
consumption for each subregion. The 
production constraints are of the 
form 
where Yc is the yield of the cth crop, 
Pic is the produc t ivi ty 0 f the cth 
crop on the ith land class, and Lic is 
the amount of land in class i allocated 
to crop c. Four land classes consistent 
with SCS designations were included in 
the model. 
Water consumption constraints were 
written for each season as 
II 
i c 
where c is an index on crops, t is an 
index on seasons, qct is the per acre 
consumptive use water requirement 
(adjusted for seasonal precipitation) 
for the cth crop for the tth season, 
Lic is the amount of land assigned to 
the icth crop in land class i, and Qt 
is the amount water available for 
irrigation in the tth season, adjusted 
for conveyance and application effi-
ciences. Crop rotat ion constraints as 
recommended by Anderson (1972) were 
also included. 
Solution Process and the Expected 
Values of Stochastic Variables 
Solution Process 
Water planners do not have perfect 
information when they make decisions. 
Decisions on releases must consider 
expected future inflows as well as 
probable future demands. Since both 
supply and demand are stochastic, 
an iterative approach was taken to 
obtain an optimal water supply alloca-
tion, with each iteration estimating the 
optimal values of control variables for 
the next season. The iteration process 
proceeds as follows. 
At the end of the winter season 
(April 30), the values of the stream-
flows are known. These are used to 
forecast expected values of streamflows 
for the fo llowi ng five months (May 
Table 19. Capacities of major Salt Lake County reservoirs. 
Reservoir 
Mt. Dell 
Lake Mary 
Twin Lakes 
Lower Bells Canyon 
Reservoir 
Stream 
Parleys Creek 
Big Cottonwood Creek 
Big Cottonwood Creek 
Bells Canyon Creek 
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Capacity (ac-ft) 
3400 
740 
940 
420 
Crop yields by land productivity 
class specified by Anderson (1972) were 
used to estimate production for each of 
eight crops. Seasonal water require-
ments for these crops were obtained from 
Anderson (1972) and from published crop 
consumpt ive use requirements for north-
cental Utah (SCS 1976). 
In general, agricultural benefits 
can be computed as: 
Y - k L 
cri c cri 
where BA is the net benefit of agricul-
tural production, net of water supply 
costs, c is an index on crops, r is an 
index on subregions, i is an index on 
land classes, ac is the sale price of 
the cth crop, Ycri is the total yield 
of the cth crop in the rth subregion 
from the i th land class, kc is the 
cost of land preparation, ha:rvesting, 
etc., for the cth crop, and Lcri is 
the amount of land allocated to the cth 
crop, rth subregion, ith land class. 
The crops considered were: 
1. Full season alfalfa 
2. Partial season alfalfa 
3. Barley 
4. New alfalfa with a barley nurse 
crop 
5. Corn silage 
6. Sugar beets 
7. Pasture 
8. Wheat 
Water supply costs. The supply 
costs were estimated from Salt Lake City 
Water Department budgets contained in 
the annual report s. In general, water 
supply costs reflect the costs of 
collecting the water from a source and 
transporting the water to a destination 
for use or for treatment. Table 18 
shows estimated costs of water supply 
from various sources. 
Table 18. Estimated water supply cos ts 
for various sources. 
Source 
City Creek 
Parleys Creek 
Big Cot tonwood 
Little Cottonwood 
Deer Creek Imports 
Wells 
Model Constraints 
Cost ($/ac-ft> 
81.02 
73.60 
66.71 
71.34 
86.73 
78.75 
Water supply. Water supply to the 
M&I sector within a subregion for a 
given season is bounded by the total 
water available from other subregions 
minus exports to other subregions. In· 
general, the major surface water sup-
pI ies for the M&I sector come from the 
six Wasatch Front streams and Deer Creek 
Reservoir. Irrigation water is limited 
to the total water available from canal 
systems diverting water from the Jordan 
River, from wells, and from other 
surface water sources. The agricultural 
sector maintains some rights on mountain 
streams that produce water of a quality 
suitable for treatment and distribution 
to the M&I sector. Under a true market 
situation, this water is available for 
sale for M&I uses. 
The model places total annual 
limits for each subregion on the 
amount of well water that can be ex-
tracted. These limits were obtained 
from Bishop et al. (1975). Surface 
waters on ungaged streams available 
in any given season for usage by the 
appropriate economic sectors are esti-
mated as the 90 percent probability 
flows as published by MWDSC et al. 
(1982). This probability was selected 
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Table 22. Summary of solution results for five model runs. 
Total Net Groundwater Wasatch Front 
Wasatch Front 
Water for 
Irrigation 
(1000 ac-ft) 
Net Agricultural 
Benefit 
($106 ) 
Run Benefit Use for M&I Water for M&I 
Number ($106 ) (1000 ac-ft) (1000 ac-ft) 
1 53.20 45.6 52.9 1.8 
1.7 
6.1 
2.4 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2 53.23 44.5 53.1 
3 47.87 25.5 42.1 
4 53.17 51.0 44.8 10.2 
10.2 5 47.86 28.5 39.1 
Both free market runs (with perfect 
knowledge and stochastic information 
respectively) performed better than any 
of the runs involving water conservation 
or maintenance of irrigation water 
rights on Wasatch Front streams. In 
interpreting these figures) the absolute 
numbers given as benefit estimates are 
not accurate since the M&I demand curves 
are hyperbol ic. One should c.ompare 
differences. 
The two free market runs gave 
similar results. The first run has 
slightly lower net benefits and small 
differences in the distribution of water 
use by source. It is interesting that 
the iterative approach to stochasticity 
of supply and demand used in the first 
run provides a solution nearly identical 
to that resulting from assumptions of 
perfect knowledge of future hydrologic 
·conditions. 
The fourth run) involving mainte-
nance of irrigation water rights but 
no water conservation measures) produces 
benefits similar to those from the two 
free market runs. It replaces the 
surface water lost to M&I because of 
prior rights to agriculture by addi-
tional groundwater usage to augment the 
reduc ed surface supplies. Groundwater 
pumping is greatest in the fourth run 
because both demands and surface water 
constraint were greatest. 
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The third and fifth runs employ 
measures to reduce demand in the M&I 
sector and show about five million 
dollars less benefits. Since the 
agricultural benefits are nearly the 
same) most of the reduction must be 
attributed to losses of consumer and 
produc er surplus resulting from the 
induced art ific ial shift in the M&I 
demand curves. 
Water Pricing and Hydrologic 
Stochasticity 
Table 23 summarizes the model 
estimates of optimal water prices for 
the M&I sector for selected locations in 
the county as computed for the first run 
(applying an iterative approach to 
variability in the surface inflows). 
The model raises M&I water prices as the 
growing season progresses. Price 
increases from the first month to the 
last are approximately $0.10 per 1000 
gallons. These changes reflect shifts 
in both demands and supplies as the 
summer months pass. The price shifts 
would be far less pronounced if more 
storage were available in the water 
supply system so that excess high 
surface flows in the early months could 
be saved for higher demands in later 
months. To an extent, the model uses 
the groundwater system for this purpose. 
Table 23. Optimal water prices at selected locations assuming stochastic inflows. 
Optimal Water Prices ($/ ac-ft) 
Location May June 
Salt Lake City 93.71 106.82 
South Salt Lake 66.71 79.82 
Granger-Hunter 97.04 97.04 
Murray 71 .34 71.34 
Conclusions 
The two institutional factors 
suspected of reducing benefits to 
water users during times of drought 
were inflexibilities in water pricing 
(i.e., inability of the water supply 
institutions to deliver water at a 
price equal to marginal cost) and 
sluggishness of market response to 
reallocate water to higher valued uses. 
These two problems are studied in the 
context of the 1977 drought in Salt Lake 
County. 
Optimization of the agricultural 
water use indicates that irrigation 
rights exceed the water needed for 
efficient crop production. This has 
come about through a decrease in farm 
acreage over the years without a corre-
sponding decrease in water rights. 
However, continued irrigation diversions 
of waters of a quality suitable for 
treatment and use in municipal supplies 
did not significantly reduce the eco-
nom i c ben e fit s • On ere a son i s t hat 
little surface storage is available to 
hold excess spring runoff for later M&I 
use. Also, the smaller quantities of 
high-quality water that go to agricul-
ture later in the year are easily 
replaced with inexpensive groundwater. 
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July August September 
113.78 127.45 127.45 
86.78 100.45 100.45 
104.55 104.55 104.55 
78.85 78.85 78.85 
Higher relative prices for groundwater 
pumping would change this. 
The largest efficiency losses 
resulted from inflexibly holding to the 
lower prices set for normal water 
availability conditions and the restric-
tions to municipal use that artificially 
reduced demand to the amount of water 
available. The reduced use resulted in 
a fairly substantial revenue loss 
(decline in producers surplus), but the 
greater portion of the $5 million loss 
was in consumer surplus and associated 
with large quantity shifts on a demand 
curve of low elasticity. 
These observations indicate that 
the largest gains through more efficient 
water allocation during drought, at 
least in the study area, are probably to 
be realized from allocating the reduced 
water supplies by raising prices. 
Whether temporary price increases are 
inst itutionally feasib Ie or even worth 
the cost of implementing needs to be 
explored. If more flexible pricing 
policies are to have an impact on water 
demand, the market must be sensitive to 
short-term price changes. Resident ial 
users would have to be made aware 
quickly of any price changes. This 
would require rapid mechanisms for 
distributing price information. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The very severe one-year drought of 
1976-77 brought forth a large array of 
drought relief/management programs from 
every level of government as well as 
from individual water utilities. In 
retrospect the management policies such 
as pricing, public education, and 
various rationing concepts at the level 
closest to the water users (water 
companies, associations, districts, 
municipalities, etc.) added motivation 
for conservation that resulted in 
sharing the shortages. 
The large majority of government 
relief programs in contrast provided 
capital for water development invest-
ments which were not usable during the 
I-year drought, but which will provide 
benefits during future dry years. In 
this regard, an important reason for 
such small losses in the western states 
during this very severe drought was 
that the much more serious hardships 
experienced during the long drought in 
the 1930s and other dry periods since 
had caused a political climate favorable 
to water development during previous 
decades. As a result, substantial 
carryover storage volumes in major 
reservoirs throughout the west at the 
beginning of 1977 reduced losses that 
would otherwise have been much more 
extensive and severe. 
Some government relief programs, 
however, did produce important benefits 
during the emergency. An example was 
the state emergency stock water program 
in Utah. This effort provided portable 
tanks on loan (mostly from military 
bases) to ranchers so that water could 
be hauled to stock in grazing areas. 
Federal programs such as the ASCS 
emergency stock feed program and the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water rental 
programs also provided important re lief 
when it was needed. 
Management Policies in the 
Municipal Sector--
What Worked? 
Specifically 1.n Utah, the three 
most common rationing policies were 1) 
restrictions on time for outdoor use 
(24 of 33 systems sampled used this 
po Ii c y ); 2 ) P ric e inc rea s e s (9 0 f 33 
sys tems)"; and 3) mandatory quant i ty 
restrictions (S of 33 systems). Four 
systems in the sample used both time and 
quantity restrictions. 
A regression model applied to these 
data gave the following information on 
policy effectiveness: 
1. A reduction of 1 hour per week 
in the time in which outside watering is 
allowed decreases total water use by 
1.27 gallons per day for a typical 
connection using 1000 gallons per day. 
For connections with higher use levels, 
the reduction will be greater. In 
contrast, utilities with voluntary 
restrictions sometimes (3 of 9 cases) 
experienced increased rather than 
decreased use. A reasonab Ie hypothes is 
is that water users perceive voluntary 
restrictions as a forerunner of manda-
tory restrictions and therefore attempt 
to soak their landscaping in preparation 
for that occurrence. 
2. A price increase of 1 percent 
leads to a 1/10 percent decrease in the 
quantity of water consumed. A price 
elasticity that is lower during drought 
than in normal times suggests that 
users' behavior (demand function) 
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changes during what they perceive as a 
short term emergency and that moderate 
price increases are not so effective in 
managing consumption during droughts as 
during normal periods. Short run 
adjustments are harder to make than long 
run changes. However large price 
increases had major impacts on use. A 
major system which charged a $10/1000 
gallon price for exceeding mandatory 
quantity limits experienced a 50 percent 
decrease in use. 
3. For every 1000 gallon reduction 
in the maximum allowable monthly water 
use, a reduction in use of 4.46 gallons 
per day was observed. 
From an economic efficiency point 
of view, mandatory restrictions on total 
monthly use are probably a better choice 
than mandatory outdoor time restrictions 
since the former allows users to allo-
cate water between indoor and outdoor 
use as they choose. However, both of 
these appear to be more effective in 
reducing water use than moderate in-
creases in price. It would take a 
200 percent price increase to produce a 
20 percent reduction in water use. 
Nonprice Rationing in 
the Municipal Sector 
A model was presented for deter-
m1n1ng the optimal long term price 
schedule for rationing a stochastically 
variabie water supply during the summer 
peak demand season among groups of 
municipal customers which have different 
demands. This model was applied to the 
Salt Lake City water system using 
historic data to simulate demand func-
tions for four classes of users and 
the system's supply function. Prices 
we reo b t a in e d for bot h a b 10 c k rat e 
pricing policy and a uniform rate 
policy. 
An interesting results was that 
consumer surplus is maximized by a 
decreasing block rate, that is, supply 
best matches demand when groups of users 
who consume larger quant it ies of water 
pay a lower average price than groups 
who use smaller quantities of water. 
It was also found that the current 
average price for water in Salt Lake 
($0.25 per 1000 cubic feet) is very 
close to optimal, given the ir current 
array of water sources. 
A t hi rd mode 1 analyzed various 
drought management policies in terms of 
their impact on net benefits to agricul-
tural and municipal water users. The 
model has the capability to modify 
policies monthly with a changing hydro-
logic situation. It is designed to 
optimize pricing policy and source 
selection (groundwater vs. surface 
water for example). The model as 
applied to Salt Lake County with con-
straint sets varying from total freedom 
for water exchanges between sectors with 
unlimited price changes to institutional 
constraints and flow matching those 
prevailing during the 1976-77 drought. 
Results for Salt Lake County 
suggest that a large loss (about $5 
million) in benefits (mostly consumer 
surplus) occurred during the drought due 
to inflexible prices. Optimal municipal 
water prices would have varied from $71 
to $127. The stochastic portion of the 
model makes excellent policy choices 
when operated in a mode of monthly 
policy corrections to match updated 
hyd ro logic c ond i t ions. The resul t s 
were very c lose to those where perfect 
knowledge of future hydrology was 
used. 
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This model should provide an 
excellent tool for judging water manage-
ment policies in other locations, 
both in terms of planning for drought 
and for more typical conditions. 
Overall 
Based on the case of water manage-
ment during the 1977 drought in Salt 
Lake County, mandatory water use regula-
tions proved much more effective than 
price increases in reducing water 
use to match the smaller supplies. 
A theoretical analysis of the demand and 
supply functions showed the current 
prlclng schedule to be about optimal. 
A third model showed that there were 
substantial economic losses, largely 
reduced consumer surplus for residential 
users, associated with the 1977 regula-
tions. This combination of results 
obviously suggests a need for research 
67 
on either restructuring drought water 
use regulations so that the reduc-
tions better match uses of low eco-
nomic value or on how to implement 
changes to water price in a way that 
makes the public more responsive in 
the short run. Nonstructural water 
conservation programs need to be pre-
designed from information on the 
costs and results of various alterna-
tives so that they are not hastely 
thrown together during drought emer-
gencies. 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
American Water Works Association. 1979. 
Proceedings, Water Reuse Symposium, 
March 25-30, 1979. 
Anderson, M. H. 1973. The demand for 
agricul tural water in Utah. Utah 
Water Research Laboratory publica-
tion PRWG100-4, Utah State Univer-
ity, Logan, Utah. September. 
Anderson, R. L. 1980. Water savings 
from lawn watering restrictions 
during a drought year: Ft. 
Collins, Colorado. Water Resources 
Bulletin. 
Anderson, T. C. 1972. Water resources 
planning to satisfy growing demand 
in an urbanizing agricultural 
region. Utah Water Research 
Laboratory publication PRWG123-3, 
Utah State University, Logan, 
Utah. 
Bagley, J. M., K. R. Kimball, and L. 
Kapaloski. 1980. Feas ib il i ty 
study of establishing a water 
rights banking/brokering service in 
Utah. Utah Water Research Labora-
tory, Water Resources Planning 
Series, UWRL/P-80/02, Utah State 
University, Logan, Utah. 
Baumann, D. D., J. J. Boland, J. H. 
Sims, B. Kranzer. and P. H. Carver. 
1979. The role of conservation in 
water supply planting. Institute 
for Water Resources, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, Ft. Belvoir, 
Va. 
Billings, R. B., and D. E. Agthe. 1980. 
Price elasticities for water: 
a case of increasing block rates. 
Land Economics 56(1). 
Bishop, A. B., R. Narayanan, S. 
Pratishthananda, S. E. Klemetson, 
and W. J. Grenney. 1975. Optimi-
zation of water allocation, waste-
water treatment, and reuse con-
sidering nonlinear costs, seasonal 
variations, and stochastic sup-
plies. Utah Water Research Labora-
tory publication PRWG123-2, Utah 
State University, Logan, Utah. 
Bowles, D. S., M. Frantz, T. Glover, A. 
Richardson, and J. L. Sutherland. 
1982. Development of contingency 
plans and scientific background 
studies for applying weather 
modification during drought periods 
in Utah. Report of the Utah 
Department of Natural Re sources 
and Energy to the U. S. Bureau of 
Reclamation. December. 
Bowles, D. S., T. C. Hughes, W. R. 
James, D. T. Jensen, and F. W. 
Haws. 1980. Vulnerability of 
water supply systems to droughts. 
Utah Wa t er Re search Laboratory, 
Water Resources Planning Series 
UWRL/P-80/08, Utah State Univer-
sity, Logan, Utah. 
Brown, G., Jr., and M. 
1969. Public utility 
output under risk. 
Economic Review 59(1). 
B. Johnson. 
pricing and 
American 
Buller, 0., L. D. Bark, and R. Vander-
li p . 1981 . E f f e c t 0 f we a the r 
modification on supply and total 
revenue of a region. Western 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 
6:57-67. 
California Department 
sources. 1978. 
69 
of Water Re-
The 1976-1977 
California drought: a review. 
Sacramento, Calif. 
Carlton, D. 1977. 
chastic demand. 
Review 67(5). 
Pricing with sto-
American Economic 
Comptroller General of the United 
States. 1979. Federal response to 
the 1976-77 drought: what should 
be done next? U. S. General 
Accounting Office, Washington, 
D.C. 
Crew, M. A., and P. R. Kleindorfer. 
1978. Reliability and public 
utility pricing. American Economic 
Review 68( 1). 
Crew, M. A., and G. Roberts. 1970. 
Some prob lems of pr 1C 1ng under 
stochastic supply condi tions: the 
case of seasonal pricing for 
water supply. Water Resour. Res. 
6(5). 
Davis, R. K., and S. H. Hanke. 1971. 
Pr icing and effic iency in water 
resource management. Natural 
Resources Policy Center, George 
Washington University, Washington, 
D.C. 272 p. 
Davis, R. K., and S. H. Hanke. 1972. 
Municipal water. In: 1971 Annual 
on Benefit-Cost Analysis, edited by 
A. Harberger et a1., p. 271-295. 
Aldine Atherton, Chicago, Ill. 
Department of Water Resources/State of 
California. 1978. The 1976-1977 
California drought: a review. 
Dyke, P. T. 1977. Yield response 
handbook. Economi c Re search 
Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
Ellerbrock, M. J., and J. C. Hite. 
1979. Drought emergency planning 
in the Uni ted St ates: a survey 
of the state-of-the-art. Un-
published, Clemson WRRI. 
70 
Federal Power Commission and Federal 
Energy Administration. 1977. 
Impacts of the western drought 
on the regional' electricity s itu-
ation. 
Flack, J. E. 1981. Resident ial water 
conservation. Journal of the 
Water Resources Planning and 
Management Division, ASCE 107(WR1): 
85-95. 
Gaffney, M. 1962. Comparisons of 
market pricing and other means of 
allocating water resources. Water 
Law and Policy in the Southeast, 
paper presented at Inst. of Law and 
Govt., University of Georgia, 
Athens, pp. 195-229. 
Gaffney, M. 1969. Replacement of 
individual by mass systems 1n 
urban growth. Proc. American 
Re a I Est ate U r ban E con. As soc. 
4:21-68. 
Gardner, B., and S. Schick. 1964. 
Factors affecting consumption 
of urban household water in north-
ern Utah. Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin 449, Utah State 
Univerity, Logan, Utah. 
Grima, A. P. 1979. Municipal water 
demand management. Water Spectrum 
(Summer), pp. 27-35. 
Hanke, S. H. 1972. Pricing urban water. 
In: Public Prices for Public 
Products, edited by S. J. Mushkin, 
p. 283-306. Urban Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 
Hanke, S. H., and R. K. Davis. 1971. 
Demand management through respon-
sive pr1c1ng. J. Amer. Water Works 
Assoc. 63(9):555-560. 
Hanke, S. W. 1970a. Demand for water 
under dynamic conditions. Water 
Resour. Res. 6(5):1253-1261. 
Hanke, S. W. 19 70b . 
charac t er is tics 
Some behavioral 
associated with 
residential water 
Water Resour. Res. 
price changes. 
6(5):1383-1386. 
Hansen, R. D. 1981. A mult ivariate 
analysis of municipal water use in 
Utah. PhD dissertation, Utah State 
University, Logan, Utah. 
Hansen, R. D., and R. Narayanan. 1981. 
A monthly time-series model of 
municipal water demand. Water 
Resour. Res. 17(4):578-585. 
Harnett, J. S. 1978. Effects of the 
California drought on the East 
Bay Municipal Utility District. 
Journal American Water Works 
Association Vol. 70. 
Harrison, R. 
drought. 
1979. Response to 
Water Spectrum 9:24-41. 
Hirshliefer, J., J. C. DeHaven, and J. 
W. Milliman. 1960. Water supply: 
economics, technology and policy. 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Hite, J. C. 1979. -Drought emergency 
planning in the United States: 
a survey of the state of the art. 
Howe, C. W., P. K. Alexander, J. A. 
Goldberg, S. Sertner, and H. P. 
Studer. 1980. Drought induced 
problems and responses of.small 
towns and rural water entit ies in 
Colorado: The 1976-1978 drought. 
Completion Report OWRT Project No. 
A-045-COLO. 
Howe, C., and F. P. Linaweaver. 1967. 
The impact of price on residential 
water demand and its relation to 
system design and price structure. 
Water Resources Research 3(1):13-
32. 
Howitt, R. E., W. D. Watson, and R. M. 
Adams. 1980. A reevaluation of 
price elasticities for irrigation 
water. Water Resources Research 
16(4):623-628. 
Hughes, T. 1980. Peak period design 
standards for small western U.S. 
water supply systems. Water 
Resources Bulletin 16(4):661-667. 
Hughes, T. C., G. Bigler, R. Griffin, 
J. Harvey, L. D. James, J. Olds, 
A. Richardson, and N. Steinquist. 
1978. Utah's drought experience. 
Report PRWG 224-1. Utah Water 
Research Laboratory, Utah St ate 
University, Logan, Utah. 
Hughes, T. C., C. Bigler, J. Olds, 
R. Griffin, A. Richardson, L. D. 
James, N. Stenquist, and J. Harvey. 
1978. Utah's 1977 drought. 
P-78/07, Utah Water Research 
Laboratory, Utah State University, 
Logan, Utah. 
Hu tchins, 
1965. 
W. A., and D. W. Jensen. 
The Utah law of water 
rights. State Engineer of Utah, in 
cooperation with Natural Resources 
Economics Division, Economic 
Research Service, USDA, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 121 p. 
Institute for Policy Research. 1977. 
Directory of federal drought 
assistance 1977. Printed for the 
Western Region Drought Action Task 
Force by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
James, L. D., and W. H. Andrews. 1978. 
Water conservation information 
dissemination during the 1977 
drought emergency. Water Resources 
Planning Series Report P-78-002, 
Utah Wa ter Re search Labora tory, 
College of Engineering, Utah State 
University, Logan, Utah. 
James, L. D., and R. R. Lee. 1971. 
Economics of water resources 
planning. McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, New York. 
Ke Iso, M. M . 1 9 6 7 . The wa t e r i s 
71 
different syndrome, or what is 
wrong with the water industry? 
Paper presented at the Third 
American Water Resources Con-
ference, AWRA, San Franc isco, 
Calif. 
Lamm, R. D. (Governor). 1981. Colorado 
drought response plan. Denver, 
Colorado. 
Larkin, D. G. 1978. Engineering 
solutions to Bay Area drought 
cond i t ions. Journal of the Wa ter 
Resources Planning and Management 
Division, ASCE, 14171 (WR1, Nov.): 
235, 351. 
Layard, P. R. G., and A. A. Walters. 
1978. Micro economic theory. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Linaweaver, F. P., Jr., J. C. Geyer, and 
. J. B. Wolff. 1966. Summary report 
on the residential water 'use 
research project. Amer. Water 
Works Assoc. 59(3):267-281. 
Maier, W. J., J. DeZellar, and R. M. 
Miller. 198. Benefits from water 
conservation depend on comprehen-
sive planning. Water Resources 
Bulletin 
Ma t t h ai, H . F . 1 9 79 . Th e d r 0 ug h t 
of 1976-77 and irrigation prac-
tices. Irrigation and Drainage in 
the Nineteen-Eighties, ASCE, 
Irrigation and Drainage Division 
Special Conference. 
McGarry, R. S., and J. M. Brusnigham. 
1979. Increasing water and sewer 
rates schedule: a tool for conser-
vation. Journal of the Am. Water 
Works Assoc. 71:9, <474. 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District, and Salt Lake 
City Corporation. 1982. Salt Lake 
County area-wide water study. 
Meyer, R. A. 1975. Monopoly pricing 
and capacity choice under un-
certainty. 1975. American Eco-
nomic Review 65(3). 
72 
Meyers, C. J., and A. D. Tarlock. 1980. 
Wa ter resource management. Second 
edition. The Foundation Press, 
Inc., Mineola, N.Y. 1127 p. 
Minton, G. D., R. Williams, and T. 
Murdock. 1979. Developing a 
conservation program tailored 
to area needs. Journal of the 
Amer. Water Works Assoc. 71:9, 
480. 
Narayanan, R., B. C. Jensen, A. B. 
Bishop, and K. S. Lyon. 1976. An 
economic appraisal of reuse con-
cepts in regional water supply 
planning. Utah Water Research 
Laboratory publication PRWGI23-3, 
Utah State University, Logan, 
Utah. 
National Water Commission. 1973. Water 
policies for the future. Final 
Report to the Pres ident and to the 
Congress of the United States. 
Washington, D.C. 
Panzar, J. C., and D. S. Sibley. 1978. 
Public utility pricing under 
risk: the case of self rationing. 
American Economic Review 68(5). 
Pratishthananda, S., and A. B. Bishop. 
1977. A nonlinear multilevel 
model for regional water resources 
planning. AWRA Water Re sources 
Bulletin 13(3). 
Robie, R. B. 1977 . 
by a severe 
institutions. 
of Agricultural 
938-942. 
Pressures created 
drought on water 
American Journal 
Economics 59(Dec.): 
Ro sen b erg, N. J. (e d ito r ) . 1 9 7 8 . 
North American drought. AAAS 
Selected Symposium 15. American 
Assoc iation for the Advancement of 
Science, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., 
N.W., Washington, D.C. 
Salas, J. D., J. W. Delleur, V. Yev-
jevich, and W. 1. Lane. 1980. 
Applied modeling of hydrologic time 
series. Water Resources Pub lica-
tions, Littleton, Colorado. 
Salt Lake City Department of Public 
Utilities (Water Supply and Water-
works). 1978-1980. Annual Report. 
Sherman, R., and M. Visscher.. 1978. 
Second best pricing with stochastic 
demand. American Economic Review 
68(1) • 
Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. 1976. Crop 
consumptive irrigation requirements 
and irrigation efficiency coeffi-
cients for the United States. 
Special Projects Division, SCS, 
USDA. 
A tale of two well systems. 1979. 
American City and Country (Sept.), 
pp. 99-101. 
Taylor, L. D. 1975. The demand for 
electricity: a survey. The Bell 
Journal of Economics 6(1). 
Turnovsky, S. J. 1969. The demand for 
water: some empirical evidence on 
consumers' response to a commodity 
uncertain in supply. Water Resour. 
Res. 5(2). 
73 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 198!. 
Southwest drought research program. 
Report of the Division of Atmos-
pheric Resources Research, Engi-
neering and Research Center, 
Denver, Colorado. 
Van Es, J. C., L. C. Keasler, and R. 
L • Wh itt en bar g e r • 1 98 0 . Th e 
response of Illinois municipal 
water systems to a prolonged period 
of drought. Research Report 152. 
Water Resources Center, University 
of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. 
Vickrey, W. S. 1969. Decreasing 
costs, publically administered 
prices, and economic efficiency: 
The PRB system. Joint Economic 
Committee, 9lst Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 125-126. 
Whipple, W., Jr. 1981. An economic 
analysis of water conservation 
policy. AWRA Water Resources 
Bulletin 17(5):814. 
Young, R. 1973. Price elasticity of 
demand for municipal water: a 
case study of Tucson, Arizona. 
Wa ter Re sources Re search 9 (4) : 
1068-1072 . 

APPENDIX 
1976-77 DROUGHT RELIEF ACTIVITY SUMMARY 
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-...j 
0"\ 
Sector: Municipal/Domestic 
Program Design 
Mandatory restriction to 
50 percent of normal out-
door use ($lO!K gal penalty 
for violation (also time 
restrictions) 
Public education (on con-
servation) via messages 
enclosed with monthly bill 
Supply increase - drilled 
more wells 
a. Time limitation for 
outdoor use 
b. Quantity limits 
c. Price increases 
d. Public eduction 
Effec t iveness 
Very good -
almost no 
violation 
Good response 
revealed in 
post drought 
survey 
Variable re-
sults (see 
regression 
analysis 
section) 
Constraints and 
Side Effects 
Large decrease in 
revenue. Some 
landscaping de-
stroyed due to 
fear of penalty. 
Increase to above 
normal use during 
month following 
Ii fting of re-
strictions 
Local Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Salt Lake County 
(Utah) Water Con-
servancy District 
Miscellaneous Utah 
cities and towns 
Reference 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
-..I 
-..I 
Sector: Municipal/Domestic 
Program Design 
Reduce use: voluntary 
demand conservation 
program 
Reduce use: pr1ce 
increases 
Damage reduction/recovery; 
price increases to generate 
revenues for maintenance 
and repair 
Augment supply: short-
term exchange~ truck in 
water, system repair, 
wells 
Reduce use: various 
outdoor watering 
restrictions 
Reduce use: mandatory 
quantity restrictions 
Reduce use: mandatory 
quantity restriction 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
change point of withdrawal 
to hgher quality location 
Effectiveness 
Fairly effec-
tive 
Revenues in-
creased but 
use reductions 
were mixed. 
Sharp 
most effective 
in short run 
20 percent ex-
pected reduction 
in withdrawal 
57% reduction 
requirement 
was not by 
70% red uc t ion 
30% needed 
reduction was 
met 
Preserved 
quality of 
intake at 
acceptable 
levels 
Constraints and 
Side Effects 
Decreased revenues 
in face of rising 
maintenance costs; 
but one town in-
creased revenue. 
Drought impacts 
tend to uncover or 
exacerbate existing 
problems 
Metering improves 
price responsiveness 
Salinity problems 
Organizational 
cooperation allow-
ing use of canal 
for conveyance 
Local Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Sma 11 cit i e s , 
Colorado 
Ft. Collins, 
Colorado 
Marin Munic. 
Water District 
Reference 
Howe et 
al. 1980 
Anderson 
1980 
Larkin 
1978 
Larkin 
1978 
""-J 
00 
Sector: Municipal/Domestic 
Program Design 
Reduce use: mandatory 
use reduction of 25% 
Augment supply: purchase 
F ............. Y'Y"O ~t- " .......... T/'<"\"'~"" 
Reduce use: mandatory 
35% use reduction 
Augment supply: accelerate 
development underway; move 
point of diversion of 
supplemental supply 
Augment supply: purchase 
from state water 
Reduce use: install 
meters and flow restrictors 
on faucets, ing 
pr1ce 
Effectiveness 
57% reduction 
47% reduction 
Satisfactory 
33% reduction 
in household 
use in hypo-
thetical 
western urban 
system 
Constraints and 
Side Ef fec t s 
Organization and 
r!l,...il;r;Ac t-n 
L~dLLVLdL~ OUppLL~O 
over large area 
Organizational co-
operation 
Organization co-
operation to 
secure release of 
water and inter-
connect systems 
Reductions in 
return flows, 
revenue losses from 
reduced use more 
than offset by 
revenue increase 
from price hike 
Local Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
San Francisco 
Water Dept., 
Calif. 
East Bay Municipal 
Utility Dept., 
Calif. 
Marin Municipal 
Water District 
Hypothetical 
Reference 
Larkin 
1978 
Larkin 
1978 
Larkin 
1978 
Flack 1981 
Sector: Municipal/Domestic 
Program Design 
Reduce use. augment supply 
Damage reduction and re-
covery: public information 
program. technical assis-
tance 
Emergency grants for 
facilities (mostly wells 
to increase water supply) 
Revolving Fund with sub-
sidized loans for 
-...I • • ~ renovat~on-expans~on of 
municipal systems 
Effect iveness 
33 systems 
were granted 
$855.000 
$1,000,000 
added to this 
on-going re-
volving fund 
program 
Most increased 
water produc-
tion capacity 
was not us-
able during 
the drought 
qonstraints and 
Side Ef fec t s 
Late implementation 
Too much effort 
directed long-term 
actions, not im-
mediate impacts. 
State Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Colorado 
Governor's 
Culinary Grant 
Fund 
Cities Water 
Loand Fund 
Reference 
Howe et al. 
1980 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
co 
o 
Sector: Municipal/Domestic 
Program Design 
Augment supply: grants and 
loans to drought impacted 
water systems with popula-
tion > 10,000 
Augment supply: grants and 
loans to drought impacted 
water systems with popula-
tion < 10,000 
Damage reduction/recovery 
Augment supply: FmHA and 
EDA loans 
Effectiveness 
$175 million on 
268 projects, 
most in west 
questionable 
results 
$224 million 
on 595 projects 
questionable 
results 
Constraints and 
Side Effects. 
Late implementation 
inadequate standards 
for determining 
project worthiness, 
inadequate coordin-
ation with other 
programs 
Same as above 
Late implementation 
Tended not to be 
immediate drought 
related, but 
rewarded poorly 
managed systems 
Federal Initiatives 
Program/System 
Ident i Her 
Economic Develop-
ment Administration 
Community Emergency 
Drought Relief 
Program 
Farmers Home Ad-
ministration: 
Community Pro-
gram Loans and 
Grants 
FmHA and EDA/ 
Colorado 
Reference 
Comptroller 
General of 
the United 
St ates 1979 
Comptroller 
General of 
the United 
States 1979 
Howe et al. 
1980 
00 
...... 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
Allocation of water to 
fewer acres, lining of 
ditches, supply termination 
to junior water right 
owners 
Construction of wells and 
reservoirs to increase 
supply 
Accelerated sale of 
stock due to inadequate 
range condition 
Effectiveness 
Some areas actually increased 
yields due to better soil 
planted and ideal summer 
rains; but many areas 
suffered large losses in 
both annual and som~ 
perennial crops 
Too late for help during 
1977 but should produce 
future benefits 
Number of beef cattle were 
reduced by 50 percent in 
two counties - including 
some breeding stock 
Local Initiatives 
Program/System 
Ident i fier 
Irrigation companies, 
districts, and in-
dividual farms in 
Utah 
Stockmen in Utah 
Reference 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
00 
N 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
Augment supply: installation 
of irr tion systems/dry 
land conversion 
Augment supply: well drill-
ing, increased·groundwater 
use 
Reduce use: plant later, 
reduce acreage, plant 
crops with lower water 
requirements 
Reduce use: divert winter 
use to storage, crop re-
ductions, increased 
application monitoring, 
reduce conveyance loss 
Augment supply: well drill-
ing, trucking in water for 
domestic supply and stock, 
temporary exchanges and 
rentals, cloud seeding 
Effec t ivenes s 
In some cases, 
more careful 
application 
reduced use 
and improved 
yields 
Ef fie ient short 
term allocation 
should result 
from unimpeded 
rental market, 
unless return 
flows are im-
portant 
Constraints and 
Side Effects 
Declining water 
tables, increased 
pumping costs, 
subsidence 
Highly developed 
basins performed 
much better where 
cooperative 
attitudes were 
widespread 
Local Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Georgia, South 
Dakota 
South Dakota, 
Nebraska, Utah. 
Kansas, Nevada, 
Idaho, Oregon, 
California, 
Georgia 
Colorado 
Reference 
Matthai 
1979 
Matthai 
1979 
Matthai 
1979 
Howe et al. 
1980 
00 
w, 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
No interest loans to 
irrigation companies 
No interest loans to 
stockmen 
Increase in normal cloud 
seeding program 
Public education on drought 
condition and conservation 
techniques 
Tanks and vehic les 
acquired on loan basis 
mostly from military 
Effectiveness 
Fund was increased by $3.5 
million 
$2 million appropriated 
(not all used) 
$300,000 illocated but 
$100,000 returned (few 
clouds to seed) 
689 portable tanks were 
placed in use (saved 
much of breeding stock) 
State Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Revolving Construction 
Fund 
Stockwater Loan Program 
Emergency Cloud Seeding 
Program 
Drought Information 
Center 
Stockwater Hauling 
Program 
Reference 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
00 
+" 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
Reduce use, augment supply 
Damage reduction and re-
covery: public information 
program, technical assis-
tance 
Effect iveness 
Constraints and 
Side Ef fect s 
Late implementation 
Too much effort 
directed long-term 
actions, not im-
mediate impacts. 
State Initiatives 
Program/System 
Ident ifier 
Colorado 
Reference 
Howe et al. 
1980 
00 
V1 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
Grants of 80 percent of cost 
for water conservation and 
development projects 
Up to 50 percent of eligible 
livestock feed cost provided 
as a grant 
Emergency low interest loans 
to cover losses to farmers 
Loan and grant program for 
short term water supply 
assistance to communities 
under 10,000 population 
Federal crop insurance 
(FCIC) program 
5 percent loans for water 
supply and conservation 
measures and establishing 
a water bank for realloca-
tion of water 
Emergency irrigation loans 
,Purchase of emergency power 
supplies 
Loans and grants for short 
term water supply assis-
tance to communities over 
10,000 population 
Effectiveness 
$11.8 million to 6,000 
farmers in Utah) 
Total in Multistate 
Drought Region = $100 
million 
$5.1 million provided to 
Utah farmers 
$100 million 
$150 and $75 million in loans 
and grants respectively 
$50 million increase in 
FCIC capital stock 
$100 million 
$30 million 
$13.8 million 
$175 million loans ~nd 
grants 
Federal Initiat s 
Program/System 
Ident ifier 
ASCS-Emergency Conservation 
Measures Program 
ASCS Emergency Feed Program 
Farmers Home Administration 
(FmHA) Emergency Loan 
Program 
FmHA-Community Facilities 
Program 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Corp. 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Drought Emergency Program 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Emergency Fund 
Southwestern Power Ad-
ministration Community 
Drought Relief 
Economic Development 
Administration Cummunity 
Drought Relief 
Reference 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
Hughes et 
al. 1978 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
Hughes et 
al.1978 
Hughes et 
a1. 1978 
Sector: Agriculture 
Program Design 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
USBR nonprofit brokerage in 
California 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
implement water bank to shift 
surplus and annual crop water 
to higher value uses 
Augment supply: permit 
projects to develop new 
sources, increase utiliza-
00' tion of existing facilities 
~ 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
loans to farmers for repairs, 
crop losses, and working 
capital 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
loans to business, farmers, 
nonprofit organizations for 
damage repair, current 
facilities, and working 
capital 
Damage reduction/recovery: 
FmHA and SBA loans 
Effectiveness 
Not successful 
$74 millon on 
493 projects, 
most in Far 
West 
Questionable 
results claims 
moderate suc-
cess for water 
bank in Cali-
fornia 
$3,025 million 
for 92,601 loans 
Uncertain re-
sults 
$1,556 million 
for 40.601 
loans (not all 
drought related) 
Some que st ion-
ab Ie resul t s 
Little short-
term effect 
Constraints and 
Side Effects 
Legal uncertainties 
for buyers and sell-
ers. Incomplete 
jurisdiction over 
water rights. 
Physical capacity 
to transfer. 
Late implementation 
Inadequate standards 
for determining pro-
ject worthiness/ 
relation to drought 
Inadequate coordina-
tion with other 
programs 
Insufficient ad-
ministrative 
capacity 
Inadequate coordina-
tion with other 
programs 
Late implementation 
Inadequate standards 
for determining pro-
ject worthiness. In-
adequate coordination 
with other programs 
Late implementation 
Early termination/ 
inadequate follow-up 
Funds not directed 
to immediate drought 
effects. Gran,t pro-
cess too complex 
Federal Initiatives 
Program/System 
Identifier 
Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Emergency Act 
of 1977, California 
U. S. Bureau of 
Reclamation: 
Emergency Drought 
Act of 1977 
Farmers Home 
Administration 
Consolidated 
Farm and Rural 
Development Act 
Emergency Loans 
Small Business 
Administration: 
Small Business 
Act disaster loans 
EDA and FmHA/ 
Colorado 
Reference 
Robie 1978 
Comptroller 
General of 
the United 
States 1979 
Comptroller 
General of 
the United 
States 1979 
Comptroller 
General of 
the United 
States 1979 
Howe et al. 
1980 
0::> 
-..J 
Sector: Wastewater 
Program Design 
Reduce use: public infor-
mation programs on conser-
vation techniques. price 
increases. and use 
restrictions 
Effec t iveness 
20-60% use re-
duc tions. 
Wastewater 
flows decreased 
an average 18% 
in 14 Calif. 
communities 
Constraints and 
Side Ef fec t s 
Sharp. unanticipated 
waste flow reduc-
tions increase 
wastewater system 
operating costs and 
reduce operating 
efficiency by: 
accumulation of 
sediment. hydrogen 
sulfide formation, 
and clogging in 
collector system; 
shock loads of" grit. 
odor problems. in-
effective solids re-
moval. high concen-
tration wastes in 
treatment facilities. 
Planned conservation 
(with design changes) 
could lead to lower 
costs for collection 
and treatment. 
Program/System 
Ident ifier 
Colorado 
Reference 
Howe et al. 

